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Capturing Volition Itself: Employee
Involvement and the TEAM Act*
Johanna Oreskovict
This article analyzes the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act
of 1997, a proposed amendment to Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act. Section 8(a)(2), which makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to dominate labor organizations, was intended to outlaw the
company-unions of the 1930s. According to supporters of the TEAM Act,
however, many modem employee involvement programs may also violate
Section 8(a)(2). The TEAM Act clarifies the problematic legal status of
such programs by permitting employers in non-union workplaces to estab-
lish groups devoted to discussion of areas of "mutual interest," provided
these groups do not interfere with employees' exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.
This article begins from the premise that an important goal of the
NLRA was to further greater democratization of industry and asks whether
employee involvement groups initiated, structured, and controlled by em-
ployers can perform a similar function, and concludes that they cannot.
The author contends that modern employee involvement groups are the con-
temporary manifestation of an alternative, management-initiated coopera-
tive model of labor relations, which reached its most coherent form as
welfare capitalism. This model, however, is inconsistent with the principle
of employee self-organization upon which the NLRA is based because ulti-
mate decision-making authority remains, at all time, firmly in the hands of
management. While employee involvement groups generally may help to
fill the void created by the decline of traditional unions, the TEAM Act is
not the answer. It fails to reconcile the tensions between the cooperative
and collective bargaining models. Indeed, the TEAM Act creates an excep-
tion to Section 8(a)(2) which, in effect, swallows the rule. Passage of the
TEAM Act would, therefore, cut away one of the pillars of the NLRA 's con-
ception of industrial democracy.
* The title of this paper is based on the following: "There is no subjugation so perfect as that
which keeps the appearance of freedom, for in that way one captures volition itself." JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, EMILE (quoted in William Tench, 'Worker Involvement' Means Union Busting, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 14, 1995, at A18).
t B.A., M.A., J.D. State University of New York at Buffalo. The author wishes to thank Pro-
fessor James B. Atleson for his many helpful suggestions during the course of the preparation of this
article and George M. Greenberger for his thoughtful reading of earlier drafts. Any remaining inaccura-
cies are solely the author's responsibility. The author dedicates this article to her family and to the
memory of her grandparents.
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I1NTRODUCTION
Two recent developments in labor relations practice have challenged
the viability of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)1 and raised ques-
tions about the traditionally-understood labor-management relationship.
First, since the early 1980s, the number of labor-management cooperative
programs in the workplace has increased significantly.2 Grouped under the
general rubric of employee involvement (EI),3 these programs assume a va-
riety of forms, but they share assumptions about the nature of labor-man-
agement relations and have common structural characteristics. El
repudiates adversarial conceptions of labor relations. Instead, El conceptu-
alizes the workplace as an organic whole, characterized by collaborative
relationships and common interests.4 In most cases, El programs are the
result of management initiatives to increase productivity and/or quality' in
the face of increasingly stiff international competition. 6 Many EI programs
initially focus on production or quality concerns, but it is not uncommon for
El programs to consider conditions of work or other aspects of the employ-
ment relationship.7 Indeed, students of the El movement note that em-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Audrey Anne Smith, Comment, The Future of Labor Management Cooperation
Following Electromation and E. I. du Pont, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 225, 226 (1995) (noting that in
1982, approximately 14% of all corporations and 33% of corporations with 500 or more employees had
instituted labor-management cooperative efforts); COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEPT. OF LAn., U.S. DEPT. OF Comm., FACT-FINDING REPORT 33 (1994) [herein-
after DUNLOP COMM'N. FACT-FINDING REP.] (noting that in 1987, 70 percent of Fortune 1000 firms in
the manufacturing and service sectors reported that they used some form of employee involvement
program. In 1990, the number had increased to 86 percent. In a 1993 survey of 51 large firms, between
80 and 91 percent of these firms reported using some form of employee involvement). See also Christo-
pher J. Martin, Electromation and Its Aftermath, 19 EMp. REL. L.J. 134 (1993) (noting that in 1993, an
estimated 30,000 employee involvement programs were in operation, involving 80 percent of the For-
tune 1,000 companies). Employee involvement (El) programs exist in both union and non-union work-
places. This paper, however, focuses primarily on El programs in non-union workplaces. For discussion
of El programs in unionized workplaces, see infra notes 321-28 and accompanying text. For discussion
of union leaders' responses to EI, see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
3. See generally A.B. Cochran I1, We Participate, They Decide: The Real Stakes in Revising
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 458, 462-63 (1995)
(noting that lack of standardized labels and the wide variety of programs in operation make precise
classification of El programs difficult).
4. See Karl E. Klare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy
Perspective, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 39, 57, 58 (1988).
5. See Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Sec-
tion 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499, 504 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Removing Impediments to Employee Participation/Electromation: Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Oppor-
tunities, 104th Cong. 30 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participa-
tion] (statement of Howard V. Knicely, Executive Vice President, TRW, Inc.); Teamwork for
Employment and Management Act of 1995: Hearing of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
United States Senate, 104th Cong. 78-79 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing: TEAM Act of 1995] (statement of
Howard V. Knicely, Executive Vice President, TRW, Inc.). See also Cochran, supra note 3, at 463-64.
7. See Jonathan B. Goldin, Comment, Labor-Management Cooperation: Bath Iron Works' Bold
New Approach, 47 ME. L. REv. 415, 434, 435 (1995).
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ployee involvement in workplace decision-making often necessitates
discussion of wages, hours, or conditions of work.8
These types of discussions, however, may render El programs in non-
union workplaces illegal. Specifically, management design, initiation, and/
or participation in El groups, when coupled with discussion of mandatory
bargaining topics, may violate Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. 9
The second development is that union density has dropped steadily and
significantly since the mid-1950s; ° never more than 50%, by 1995, only
about 12% of private sector workers belonged to a union."x Thus, the
NLRA, with its enshrinement of collective bargaining and requirement that
workers be represented only by labor organizations that are structurally in-
8. See id. at 435.
9. Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to
it." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(2) (1994). The NLRB's decision in Electromation underscored the problematic
legal status of El programs under current law. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced,
Electromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). There, the NLRB found that the com-
pany violated Section 8(a)(2) by establishing several joint labor/management committees which dealt, at
least to some extent, with conditions of work. The Electromation decision has served as a rallying point
for El supporters who argue that the nation's labor laws must be reformed to respond to the realities of
contemporary labor/management relations. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. E228 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1995)
(Rep. Fawell) ("Perhaps the best known example of the legal impediments confronting companies that
wish to utilize employee participation programs is the NLRB's December 1992 decision involving Elec-
tromation, Inc."); Hearing: TEAM Act of 1995, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Senator Nancy Kas-
sebaum, Chair of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate) (noting that the
decision has called into question the legality of all employee involvement programs and that the TEAM
Act is designed to remove legal barriers to the introduction of El programs and to create the "flexibility
for a variety of different employee team efforts to move forward"); Hearing on H.R. 743, The Teamwork
for Employees and Managers Act: Hearing Before the Committee on Economic and Educational Oppor-
tunities House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 7 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing: H.R. 743] (statement of
Michael P. Morley, Senior Vice-President and Director of Human Resources, Eastman Kodak Com-
pany) ("that decision sounded an alarm to the 30,000 workplaces in the United States that have adopted
employee involvement. It told them that worker systems incorporating employee involvement in non-
union settings were potentially in violation of the National Labor Relations Act."). But see id. at 38
(statement of David M. Silberman, Director, AFL-CIO Task Force on Labor Law) ("Despite all the hype
surrounding Electromation... the case had nothing to do with work teams, quality circles, or any of the
other form [sic] of legitimate employee involvement that are supposedly under legal attack and that H.R.
743 is supposedly needed to 'save' from that attack.").
10. See Cochran, supra note 3, at 466. See also id. at 460 ("[T]he pressures to cooperate more
closely with management and to weaken the protections of the Wagner Act come at a time when unions
are at a historic nadir in their strength.").
11. See, e.g., Michael Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unor-
ganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KErNr L. REv. 59 n. 1 (1993) ("Union density as a percentage of private
nonagricultural wage and salary workers has declined from a high of 38 percent in 1954 to 11.5 percent
in 1992."); Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Cm.-
KENT L. REV. 3 (1993) (unions represent under 13 percent of private sector workers); Klare, supra note
4, at 40 (union density at 18 percent in 1987); Cochran, supra note 3, at 466 (union density at 16.1
percent in 1990); Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal
Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 BYU L. Rnv. 727, 734-35 (in 1960, approximately 34
percent of the private sector workforce was organized; in 1993, 12 percent of the private sector
workforce was unionized. That figure is expected to fall to 7 percent by the year 2000.).
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dependent of management,' 2 has little direct relevance to the workplace ex-
perience of the majority of American workers. Indeed, if employees
experience opportunities for collective decision-making at work, those op-
portunities are significantly more likely to come via participation in an El
program than through a union. 3
These two developments-the growth of El programs and the decline
in union density-suggest that a major change in American labor relations
practice may be underway, a change the NLRA may be ill-equipped to ac-
commodate.14 This perception of a mismatch between the NLRA and the
realities of the contemporary workplace has resulted in a number of propos-
als from supporters and critics of El to reform the nation's labor law.'
5
This article examines one such proposal: the Teamwork for Employees and
Managers Act (TEAM Act).' 6
The TEAM Act is a direct response to the Electromation decision,
which supporters of the Act claim contributed to confusion over the legality
of El programs.17 The Act would amend and clarify Section 8(a)(2) by
removing from the ambit of unfair labor practices management-initiated El
programs in non-union workplaces whose activities may include discussion
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
13. The decline in union density, coupled with the increase in employee participation in El pro-
grams in non-union workplaces, suggests that increasing numbers of employees will enter El groups
rather than unions. Compare statistics on growth of EI, supra note 2, with statistics on declining union
density, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 Cm.-KErNr L. REV. 97, 98-100
(1993) (noting that the New Deal system of labor relations codified in the NLRA and the Taft-Hartley
Act no longer fits the needs of the economy or the desires of the workforce).
15. See, e.g., Labor Law: Attorneys Debate Whether NLRA Is Relevant to Today's Workplace,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 112, at d-17 (June 12, 1995) (Prof. Charles Carver, George Washington
University) ("[T]he TEAM Act should require employer-employee cooperation panels."); Employee In-
volvement: Proposal by Labor Law Professor Finds Few Supporters in Washington, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 109, at d-28 (June 27, 1995) (Prof. Charles J. Morris) (advocating change in Section 8(a)(2)
to permit any kind of El program, but requiring that all employee representatives be elected by secret
ballot); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law,
69 C-.-KErrr L. REv. 149, 188 (1993) (proposing an employee "free choice" defense to Section 8(a)(2)
complaints); Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to
Section 8(a)(2), 69 Csn.-KErrr L. REv. 129, 141-48 (creating an exception to Section 8(a)(2) permitting
employers to establish employee representation plans if: (1) employees are free to modify the plan's
structure; (2) supervisory and non-supervisory employees are represented separately; (3) employees
elect representatives; (4) employees are provided the resources needed to perform their representative
functions; (5) employees are granted due process rights in disputes with employer; and (6) employers
are required to confer with workers on all aspects of work life).
16. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 634, 105th Cong. (1997);
S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter TEAM Act].
17. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 35
F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). See Wt.LIAM F. GOODLING, TEAMWORK FOR EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS
Acr OF 1995, H.R. REP. 104-248, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1995) [hereinafter H.R. REP. 104-248].
Several members of Congress who subsequently introduced the TEAM Act submitted amicus briefs on
behalf of the company during the Board's hearings on the Electromation case. See generally Michael H.
LeRoy, Can TEAM Work? Implications of an Electromation and du Pont Compliance Analysis for the
TEAM Act, 71 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 215, 234 (1996).
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of hours and conditions of work. 8 The Act affirms employees' rights to
organize and to bargain collectively. 9 Thus, its supporters argue, the
TEAM Act is not intended to weaken unions; instead, passage of the TEAM
Act would enable innovative programs that empower workers and enjoy
their support to flourish. 20 For opponents, however, passage of the TEAM
Act would result in the reintroduction of employer-dominated company un-
ions similar to those of the 1930s,2 organizations that the framers of the
NLRA specifically intended to ban.
The debate surrounding the TEAM Act-characterized on one side by
utilitarian arguments cast in the language of popular psychology and on the
other by dire predictions of a return to a dimly remembered but nonetheless
disreputable period in American labor relations-fails to come to grips with
two larger concerns that ought to inform discussions about proposals to
alter the nation's labor law. First, to what extent should the social relations
of the workplace harmonize with those of the polity? Phrased another way,
how can the egalitarian, participatory ideals of the larger society be recon-
ciled with the prerogatives of management direction and control inherent in
capitalist enterprises? Second, what function should labor law play in rec-
onciling a democratic polity with a hierarchical workplace?
18. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1995) (to allow legitimate El programs to evolve and
proliferate, in which workers may discuss issues involving terms and conditions of employment). See
also 141 CONG. REc. H9531 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodling) (the TEAM Act
"specifically provides that it does not ... apply in unionized workplaces"); H.R. Rep. 104-248, supra
note 17, at 18; JAMES M. JEFFORDS, TEAMWORK FOR EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS Acr OF 1997, S. REP.
105-12, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 22 (1997) [hereinafter S. REP. 105-12].
19. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (1995) ("[E]mployers who have instituted legitimate [El]
programs have not done so to interfere with the collective bargaining rights guaranteed by the labor
laws, as was the case in the 1930's when employers established deceptive sham 'company unions' to
avoid unionization .... "); id. at § 3 (employee involvement programs legalized by the TEAM Act
would not "have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representatives of the employ-
ees or to negotiate or to enter into collective bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend
existing collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor organization..."); id. at
§ 4 ("Nothing in this Act shall affect employee rights and responsibilities contained in this provision
other than Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended."); H.R. REP. 104-228, supra
note 17, at 18, 19, 21; S. REF. 105-12, supra note 18, at 22-24.
20. See, e.g., The TEAM Act: Legal Problems with Employee Involvement Programs: Hearings on
S. 295 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 1, 2 (1996) [hereinafter
Hearing: Legal Problems with Employee Involvement Programs] (opening statement of Sep. Nancy
Kassebaum) (arguing that the TEAM Act is "in no way an attempt to undermine unions. It is in no way
an attempt to undermine the protections that are laid out very carefully in labor law .... "); Hearing:
TEAM Act of 1995, supra note 6, at 58 (statement of Harold P. Coxson, labor law attorney) (quoting
President William D. Marohn, President and COO of Whirlpool Corp., discussing El at Whirlpool and
claiming that "[w]e empower our employees .... [T]hey are empowered to manage themselves."); id.
(discussing Princeton Survey Research Associates survey which found that employees preferred El over
union representation by an overwhelming margin).
21. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H9524 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. William L.
Clay) (passage of the TEAM Act "would destroy one of the most essential protections provided under
the NLRA: protection against company-dominated sham unions").
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The framers of the NLRA confronted these questions. The Act is pre-
mised on a conception of industrial democracy rooted in contract law. This
conception sees worker collective action through independent unions as the
best means of equalizing a bargaining equation heavily weighted in favor of
management.22 The TEAM Act is merely a proviso to and a clarification of
Section 8(a)(2). Thus, even though the TEAM Act exempts, for policy rea-
sons, specific types of El programs from the strictures of Section 8(a)(2),
the outcomes envisioned by the TEAM Act cannot be inconsistent with the
underlying premises of either Section 8(a)(2) or the NLRA as a whole.
This article argues that the critics of the TEAM Act are correct in their
contention that legalization of management-initiated El programs in non-
union workplaces is inconsistent with the collective bargaining model en-
shrined in the NLRA. The critics are also correct in their contention that
modem El programs break little new ground in industrial relations practice
and that passage of the TEAM Act would legalize employer-dominated la-
bor organizations. But the critics' arguments fail to elucidate clearly why
El programs are incompatible not only with the collective bargaining model
but also with the goal of achieving greater democratization of industry.
Collective bargaining and management-initiated El programs are in-
compatible not because one is adversarial and the other cooperative, but
because the principle of worker self-organization upon which the NLRA is
premised is antithetical to management creation and structuring of labor
organizations. The analogy that critics of the TEAM Act draw between the
company unions of the 1930s and modem El programs, however, is inaccu-
rate in some respects, and too limiting to capture fully the contradictions
inherent in the management-initiated cooperative model which render that
model an inadequate vehicle for the achievement of industrial democracy.23
Instead, it is more useful to conceptualize modem El programs as the con-
temporary manifestation of an alternative tradition in American labor rela-
tions practice that has waxed and waned throughout the century, but which
reached its most intellectually coherent and systematic elaboration during
the 1920s in the form of "welfare capitalism.
24
22. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 514; Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act:
Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 -LRv. L. REv. 1379, 1423 (1993).
23. See LeRoy, supra note 17, at 218. For a more complete discussion of company unions, see
infra notes 52-72. For a more complete discussion of modem El programs, see infra notes 117-42 and
accompanying text.
24. The cooperative approach, of which welfare capitalism and El are a part, emphasizes mutual
employer-employee interests rather than the inevitability of labor-management conflict. The behaviorist
approach, which followed welfare capitalism, shared the assumptions of the cooperative approach. See,
e.g., Andrew A. Lipsky, Comment, Participatory Management Schemes, the Law, and Workers' Rights:
A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 39 Am. U. L. REv. 667, 672-73 (1990). For a discussion of the
Human Relations School of personnel management, see RONALD M. MASON, PARICI'AToRY AND
WORKPLAcE DEMocRAcy: A THEoRETicAL DEVELOPMENT IN CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 126 (1982).
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Like modem El, welfare capitalism was, in part, the product of em-
ployer dissatisfaction with the adversarial character of labor relations.2 5
Like modem El, a number of motives, ranging from concern about declin-
ing productivity to anti-unionism to idealism converged to shape welfare
capitalism. And, just as it is impossible to dismiss modem El programs as
self-serving attempts by management to manipulate employee perceptions
of their own interests, so too is it impossible to dismiss welfare capitalism
as merely a cynical and insincere attempt to diffuse employee unrest with
false promises of economic security and participation in company decision-
making.
Both El and welfare capitalism, nevertheless, suffer from a defect that
renders both incapable of achieving greater democratization of the work-
place. Both are premised upon management voluntarily ceding to employ-
ees some of its rights of control over the enterprise. But in both El and
welfare capitalism, the increased participation this voluntary restriction of
rights affords employees is contingent, dependent solely upon manage-
ment's continued belief that curtailment of its prerogatives is in the best
interest of the business.26 Thus, from the standpoint of industrial democ-
racy, the principle limitation of the cooperative model is that at best it func-
tions only as an enlightened form of corporate paternalism, not as a truly
democratic, participatory method of workplace governance. This is not to
say that contemporary El programs offer employees no chance to partici-
pate in workplace decision-making; however, absent the ability to make
binding decisions, participation is not always the equivalent of democracy.
In addition, as the examples of El and welfare capitalism show, despite the
rhetoric of cooperation and teamwork, management-initiated cooperative
programs also have the potential to function in authoritarian ways.
The principle defect of the TEAM Act is that it does not create suffi-
ciently clear or precise mechanisms to nurture the democratic potential of
El programs or to control against the authoritarian tendencies of El pro-
grams. As it is currently structured, the TEAM Act would effectively re-
peal Section 8(a)(2), eviscerating those provisions of the NLRA designed to
protect the formation of the independent employee organizations which are
necessary prerequisites for truly participatory workplaces.
Part I examines the conception of industrial democracy embodied in
the NLRA and the manner in which the courts have interpreted the Act's
prohibition against the creation of company-sponsored labor organizations.
Part II surveys the types of El programs currently operating in the United
States and analyzes the ways in which many El programs can run afoul of
25. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
26. See Devki K. Virk, Note, Participation with Representation: Ensuring Workers' Rights in
Cooperative Management, 1994 U. I.L. L. REV. 729, 755 (1994) (arguing that since cooperative man-
agement "creates no enforceable rights, no redress exists if the creator of the system withdraws or limits
this power. An employee group under such a system suffers from 'structural impotence.'").
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the NLRA. Part III reviews welfare capitalist programs of the 1920s and
compares them with modem El programs in an effort to identify the
strengths and the limitations of management-initiated cooperative programs
in creating more democratic, participatory workplaces. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the TEAM Act with particular emphasis on the ways in which it
protects management's interest in fostering greater productivity and effi-
ciency without protecting employees' collective bargaining rights or creat-
ing mechanisms to control the anti-democratic tendencies of management-
initiated cooperative programs.
I.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE NLRA
A. The NLRA's Conception of Industrial Democracy
Industrial democracy is a frequently used but imprecisely defined con-
cept in labor relations thought and practice.27 In the minds of some, indus-
trial democracy means that those who do the work of the organization set its
goals and policies.28 This definition denies the validity of status distinc-
tions in determining access to rights and decision-making authority within
an enterprise and is most consistent with notions of communal ownership.
Development of a definition of industrial democracy in the context of a
capitalist system is more problematic. In the United States, common law
notions of property rights that view the employer as the sole decision-maker
and absolute sovereign of the workplace persist. 29 As a result, those who
own or manage an enterprise enjoy considerable discretion over the manner
in which capital, including human capital, will be deployed. Although an
employee may be the legal equal of the employer outside of the workplace,
an employer has no duty to grant an employee the same freedom of action
or expression in the workplace that the employee enjoys in the broader soci-
ety.3" Tensions thus exist between the egalitarianism of democracy and the
27. See Hideaki Okamoto, Introduction to B.C. ROBERTS, COLLCTIrVE BARGAINING AND INDUS-
TRIAL DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND JAPAN 5 (Hironobu Kunimoto trans.,
International Center for Hosei Univ. ed.) (1981) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY] (noting that the term "industrial democracy" has been used "multivocally to indicate dif-
ferent patterns of social relations" including "collective bargaining" alone or "worker participation in the
intra-enterprise decision-making process"). See also MASON, supra note 24, at 188.
28. See Joyce Rothschild-Whitt & Frank Lindenfeld, Reshaping Work: Prospects and Problems of
Workplace Democracy, in WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1 (Frank Lindenfeld & Joyce
Rothschild-Whitt, eds. 1982).
29. See Madelyn Carol Squire, Reality Or Myth: Participatory Programs And Workplace Democ-
racy-A Proposal For A Different Role For Unions, 23 STETSON L. REv. 139, 164-65 (1993) (noting
that passage of protective legislation and modification of the employment-at-will doctrine have modified
common law notions of the employer as absolute sovereign of the workplace).
30. See SHERRI DEwrrr, WORKER PARTICIPATION AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 160
(1980) (noting that "there is a schizophrenic division between man-worker and man-citizen" and dis-
cussing attempts by political philosophers to reduce antagonism between work values and other social
values).
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prerogatives of direction and control inherent in the ownership and manage-
ment of an enterprise. In fact, it is logically impossible to reconcile the
contradictory bases of democracy and the employment relationship, at least
in a capitalist economic system: management's rights to control and direct
the enterprise can be protected only by limiting the participation of labor in
workplace decision-making, and full democratization of the workplace can
be achieved only by radically curtailing management's rights. Historically,
the latter option has been viewed as politically unacceptable in the United
States.31 It is for this reason that the conceptions of industrial democracy
developed in liberal democracies generally attempt to balance the conflict-
ing aims of social democracy against property rights in such a way that
neither system is completely sacrificed to the other.32
1. Industrial Democracy Through Collective Bargaining
The NLRA, as an integral part of the New Deal system of labor rela-
tions, represents one attempt to reconcile political democracy with the de-
mands of productive capitalism.33 In the mind of the Act's chief architect,
Senator Robert Wagner, the survival of political democracy, in the face of
the violent labor unrest and high unemployment of the Depression, de-
pended upon the democratization of industry.34 For Wagner, industrial de-
mocracy meant fair participation by workers in setting the terms and
conditions of their employment.35 Participation, in turn, would pave the
way for genuine consent, a prerequisite for the creation of a cooperative,
democratic industrial order.36 Conceptualized in this way, an important and
indispensable function of labor law is to foster the development of methods
of workplace governance that reconcile the values of the polity with those
of the workplace and to restrain the development of methods of workplace
governance which do not.
The reconciliation which the Act achieved was based not on a well-
developed theory of industrial democracy but on the legitimization of col-
lective bargaining, a system whose characteristics and practices employers
and employees had jointly shaped over time.37 Under the collective bar-
31. See id. at 67-68.
32. See id. at 8-9; MASON, supra note 24, at 147.
33. See Rogers, supra note 14, at 97, 101. See also JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssUrMP.
TIONS IN AMERIcAN LABOR LAW 41-42 (1983) (noting that the NLRA's definition of industrial democ-
racy is vague).
34. See 78 CONG. REc. 4229 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 22, 24 (1985) [herein-
after LEG. HIST. NLRA].
35. See Clyde W. Summers, Introduction and Overview: Models of Employment Representational
Participation, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 1 (1993).
36. See Barenberg, supra note 22, at 1425, 1491 (noting that Wagner believed the workforce
could "democratically consent to hierarchical discipline").
37. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 513-14. See also DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TwENi'rrl CENTURY STRU GLE 145 (1980) (noting that "the notion that
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gaining model, workers participate in workplace governance when they reg-
ulate the terms and conditions of the employment relationship through the
collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining could, thus, serve
as a voluntary means of privately ordering the employment relationship.38
In the minds of the Act's framers, a bargaining equation heavily
weighted in management's favor rendered the classical contract model of
negotiation between two individuals inapplicable to labor contracts, because
the bargaining power of employers greatly exceeded that of the individual
worker. 9 Inequality of bargaining power tainted the employment contract
with duress and coercion, and rendered meaningless the concept of mutual
assent.' Collective bargaining, however, could strike a balance between
equality and inequality of bargaining power and help to legitimate the em-
ployer-employee authority relationship. 4' Specifically, the threat of collec-
tive action would act as an inducement for management to negotiate in
good faith; therefore, collective empowerment in the labor market was nec-
essary to enable the parties to forge agreements based on genuine consent.42
In this way, collective bargaining would facilitate the "development of a
partnership between labor and management in the solution of national
problems."43 The increased bargaining power of organized labor would
also result in more equitable division of the fruits of production, thereby
enabling workers to participate meaningfully in the economic life of the
society as well." Thus, the adoption of collective bargaining as the na-
tional policy of the United States would serve as an indispensable comple-
ment to political democracy.
Although collective bargaining was to serve as the principle vehicle
for the achievement of workplace democracy, the Act also imported many
of the concepts and procedural mechanisms of political democracy into the
private realm of employment negotiations. The right of workers to self-
labor should have the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining" was recognized in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act); Milton Derber, Developments in Collective Bargain-
ing and Industrial Democracy in the United States and Canada, in COLLECTIVE BARoANGo AND IN-
DUSTRIAL DEMocRAcy, International Center for Hosei Univ., supra note 27, at 51.
38. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 533.
39. See MILTON DERBER, THm AMERICAN IDEA OF INDusTRIAL DEMoCRACY, 1865-1965, at 320-21
(1970).
40. See Virk, supra note 26, at 752. See also 78 CONG. REc. 3678 (1934), reprinted in LEG. HST.
NLRA, supra note 34, at 20 (statement of Sen. Wagner) ("We are forced to recognize the futility of
pretending that there is equality of freedom [to contract] when a single workman, with only his job
between his family and ruin, sits down to draw a contract of employment with a representative of a
tremendous organization having thousands of workers at its call. Thus, the right to bargain collectively
... is a veritable charter of freedom of contract; without it there would be slavery by contract.").
41. See Barenberg, supra note 22, at 1423.
42. But see Gottesman, supra note 11, at 90 (noting that collective bargaining departs from tradi-
tional contract law by legalizing labor's use of duress as an economic tool).
43. See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HIST. NLRA,
supra note 34, at 15.
44. See Barenberg, supra note 22, at 1427.
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organization and freedom of association extended First Amendment protec-
tions to the employment relationship.45 Exclusive representation ensured
that the principles of majority rule would govern the selection of labor's
representatives, just as they did the selection of representatives in the polit-
ical realm.4 6 The Act's procedures and protections also ensured that the
rule of law and due process would govern the private ordering of the em-
ployment relationship.47
The NLRA, therefore, provided a means to democratize the workplace
without altering in significant ways the private, contractual basis of Ameri-
can labor law. Moreover, because American unions historically had not
attempted to use collective bargaining to reorganize the economy or to dis-
place management in the operation of industry, a" the adoption of collective
bargaining was unlikely to precipitate any fundamental changes in the na-
tion's social structure.49 In both of these respects, collective bargaining
harmonized with the values and practices of American society and provided
the framers of the NLRA with a means to reconcile the social relations of
the workplace with those of the polity.5 °
2. Section 8(a)(2): The Ban on Company-Dominated Unions
The ability of a collective bargaining regime to achieve greater democ-
ratization of industry depended primarily on the creation of a balance of
power between labor and management. That balance could be struck only
if labor's representatives were not subservient to management.5 t For the
Act's framers, the principle obstacle to the creation of such an independent
labor movement was the existence of company-dominated unions.52
45. See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and the Enrichment of De-
mocracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 689 U. ILL. L. REv. 698-99 (1986) (arguing that the NLRA is
too often viewed solely as a means for striking a balance between unions and employers instead of as a
law protecting the personal freedoms of individual employees and extending democratic procedures to
industrial life). See also MASON, supra note 24, at 189.
46. See MASON, supra note 24, at 189.
47. See Summers, supra note 45, at 698.
48. See Julius G. Getman and Thomas C. Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A
Response to Professor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415, 1421-22 (1983) (noting that the collective bargaining
model triumphed over its rivals because of the congruence between it and the patterns and practices of
American society).
49. See id. at 1422.
50. See id. See also THOMAS A. KoclAN, ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDus-
TRIAL RELATIONS 24 (1986) (arguing that collective bargaining "fit[s] neatly with the American social
and political ethos favoring limited government intervention in substantive decision-making, the protec-
tion of property rights, and the freedom to contract").
51. See Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Domination of Labor Organizations and the Electromation
Case: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1812, 1818-19 (1993) (quoting
Senator Wagner, "[o]nly representatives who are not subservient to the employer with whom they deal
can act freely in the interest of employees").
52. See Squire, supra note 29, at 41 (noting the Framers' conviction that only in the absence of a
subservient relationship could an employee representative "act freely in the interest of employees").
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Although company unions and other employer-sponsored worker par-
ticipation plans had existed since the turn of the century, in the 1920s many
employers introduced new and elaborate employee representation plans.53
With the exception of those in the largest companies, the Depression ended
many of these plans.54 But following the passage of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) in 193 3, 5 the number of company unions once again
began to increase.
56
The NIRA conferred on workers rights of self-organization and mutual
assistance virtually identical to those later enshrined in the NLRA, 57 but the
NIRA did not provide adequate means for enforcing those rights. 58 More-
over, early interpretations of Section 7(a) suggested that company unions
were legal. 59 Employers, therefore, found it easy to avoid recognizing in-
dependent unions by creating company unions that bore a superficial resem-
blance to independent labor organizations.6 °
The post-NIRA company unions consciously emulated the structure of
independent trade unions with constitutions, by-laws, and employee repre-
sentatives elected by their peers. 6' But the company unions differed from
trade unions in that management customarily attended employee meetings,
few of these company unions actually bargained or signed wage contracts
with management, and absent dues provisions, they were unable to finance
53. By 1928, 869 employee representation plans were in operation which covered 1.5 million
employees. DutLop COMM'N FACT-FiNDING REP., supra note 2, at 46. For a discussion of employee
representation plans during the 1920's, see infra notes 252-74 and accompanying text.
54. See DUNLOP COMM'N FAcT-FIND NG REP., supra note 2, at 46.
55. Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). The Supreme Court struck down the NIRA in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
56. See Hearings on S. 1958: Before the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. Senate, 74th
Cong. 40 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 34, at 1416
(noting that over 69% of the company-dominated unions in existence as of 1935 began after the passage
of the NIRA).
57. Compare Section 7(a)(1) of the NIRA, 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933) ("[E]mployees shall have the
right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be
free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation
of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."), with NLRA Section 7 ("Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for . . . mutual aid and
protection."). National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935). Section 7
was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act to grant employees the "right to
refrain from any or all of such activities." ch. 120, title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994)).
58. See 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HIST. NLRA.
supra note 34, at 16-17 (arguing that a major defect of the NIRA was that it gave employees the right to
organize but not the right to be recognized). Wagner noted that "[olver 70 percent of the disputes
coming before the Labor Board have been caused by the refusal of employers to deal with representa-
tives chosen by workers." Id. See also Squire, supra note 29, at 144 n.21 (citing Edwin E. Witte, THE
BACKGROUND OF THE LABOR PROVISIONS OF THE NIRA, 1 U. CI. L. REV. 572 (1934)).
59. See ATLEsON, supra note 33, at 37.
60. See Squire, supra note 29, at 142.
61. See id. at 144.
242 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW [Vol. 19:229
strikes.6 2 Power in the company unions also remained firmly in the hands
of management, which wrote the union's constitutions and by-laws,6 3 and
generally retained the right to veto amendments to company union constitu-
tions.' The involvement of management in the internal affairs of company
unions, in Senator Wagner's view, meant, in effect, that to disagree with
one's employer was to risk one's livelihood.6 5
Employers controlled the company unions in other ways as well.
Management established age, citizenship, and length of service require-
ments workers had to meet before they were eligible to run for positions in
the company unions.6 6 Company union officials were reluctant to appeal
matters to upper management.67 Short terms of office made it difficult for
representatives to develop the expertise needed to represent employees
effectively.68
Company unions also suffered from structural weaknesses which made
it virtually impossible for them to engage in collective bargaining.69 Em-
ployers generally established and funded company unions.7" Workers typi-
cally paid no union dues; without this source of income, company unions
had no treasuries and no strike funds.7 1 Because company unions were or-
ganized in individual plants not on an industry-wide basis, it was difficult
for workers to compile comparative data on wages and conditions in other
plants; consequently, workers had little knowledge of economic conditions
in the industry as a whole.72 In all of these respects, company unions were
structurally incapable of providing workers with the independent voice and
power necessary to forge agreements with management based on mutual
consent.
Much of the testimony during the NLRA hearings focused on the treat-
ment company unions would receive under the Act. In fact, the legislative
history suggests that the debate over the NLRA was essentially a debate
62. See Martin T. Moe, Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking and the NLRA: Section 8(a)(2),
Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1127, 1134-36 (1993).
63. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 529.
64. See Squire, supra note 29, at 141-42. See also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, No. 634, CHARAcrEs-ncs OF COMPANY UNIONS 1935, at 200 (1937) [hereinafter CHARAcTER-
ISTICS OF COMPANY UNIONS].
65. See generally 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HiST.
NLRA, supra note 34, at 16.
66. See C daRcrE, sTIcs OF COMPANY UNIONS, supra note 64, at 121, 123.
67. See id. at 202.
68. Cf. id. at 121-22 (noting that representatives served for one year in the majority of company
unions).
69. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 528-30.
70. See CHARACTERISnCS OF COMPANYA UNIONS, supra note 64, at 199-200.
71. See id. at 61 (noting that of the 592 company unions surveyed in 1935, 411 reported having no
dues provisions); id. at 202 (noting that "a negligible number [of company unions] had funds to carry a
strike for any length of time").
72. See generally 78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HMST.
NLRA., supra note 34, at 24. See also CARACrERis-ncs OF COMPANY UNIONS, supra note 64, at 202.
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over whether employees should have a choice between company unions and
independent unions.73 Proponents argued that company unions could sup-
plement independent trade unionism, and that competition between the two
would result in a better single model of employee representation.74 But
Senator Wagner was adamant in his belief that company unionism was in-
compatible with collective bargaining.75 The dispositive question for Wag-
ner was whether "the employee organization is entirely the agency of the
workers."'76 Wagner labeled company-dominated unions "the greatest bar-
rier to freedom," 77 because they were "initiated by the employer; exist[ed]
by his sufferance," and their decisions were "subject to his unimpeachable
veto. '"78 As a result, collective bargaining in a company-dominated union
would always be a sham because "the employer [would] sit[ ] on both sides
of the table or pull[ ] the strings behind the spokesmen of those with whom
he [was] dealing."'79 In short, because the company-dominated union was
the creation of management it could represent only management's interests.
Thus, in answer to proponents of company unions who argued that the free-
dom of workers would be compromised if they could not elect to be repre-
sented in a company union, Wagner argued that the freedom to be
represented by an organization "that is not free is a contradiction in
terms."8'
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA represents the triumph of Wagner's view.
Under its terms, an employer violates employees' right to self-organization
and freedom of association when the employer "dominates or interferes
with the formation of a labor organization or contributes financial or other
support to it."8 1 Section 2(5)'s broad definition of the term "labor organiza-
tion" complements Section 8(a)(2) by bringing virtually any employer-
sponsored organization in which employees participate within the ambit of
73. See generally Kohler, supra note 5, at 531-32.
74. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm on Educ. and Labor, 73rd Cong. 401,
404 (1934) (statement of Henry S. Dennison of Dennison Mfg., Framingham, Mass.), reprinted in LEG.
HIST. NLRA, supra note 34, at 435, 438.
75. See 78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEo. HIST. NLRA,
supra note 34, at 23.
76. See Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th
Cong. 15 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 34, at 2489.
77. See To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 73rd Cong. 9 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HST. NLRA,
supra note 34, at 39.
78. See 78 CONG. REc. 4229 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HiST. NLRA,
supra note 34, at 24. Wagner also noted that strikes were most likely when a company union entered the
picture. Industrial strife was caused by employers' failure to honor the spirit of collective bargaining.
Id. at 24-25.
79. See Labor Dispute Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th
Cong. 15 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 34, at 2489.
80. Id.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
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Section 8(a)(2).82 Taken together, Sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) effectively ban
company-dominated unions by making it an unfair labor practice for em-
ployers to create labor organizations, write their by-laws, or contribute fi-
nancial support to them.83
B. The Structural Approach of the Supreme Court and the NLRB
Supreme Court and NLRB interpretations of Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2)
have been faithful to the Act's restrictive policy toward company-sponsored
employee organizations." Under the Supreme Court and NLRB approach,
before the question of employer domination or interference can be reached,
an employee committee or organization must first be found to be a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5). If the group is a labor
organization, the court will then determine whether it is employer-domi-
nated with the meaning of Section 8(a)(2).
The Supreme Court established the parameters of the Section 2(5)
analysis in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co," where the Court held that em-
ployee committees created by the company at each of its plants to discuss
"ideas and problems of mutual interest" were labor organizations. 86  The
committees made suggestions and discussed with management proposals
and requests concerning seniority, overtime, scheduling, wage corrections,
sick leave, and improvements in working conditions and facilities.87 Man-
agement was free to accept or reject the proposals.88
The Supreme Court overturned the Fifth Circuit's decision that the
committees were not labor organizations. The circuit court had held that
the term "dealing with" meant "bargain[ing] with" the employer.89 In the
court's view, the committees were not labor organizations within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) because they did not bargain with the employer.9" Ab-
sent bargaining, these employee committees were not statutory labor
organizations. 9t
82. Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as "any organization of any kind ... in which em-
ployees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
93. The Act did not prohibit employers from setting up organizations that dealt insurance, em-
ployee benefits or recreation, but it did make clear that collective bargaining would be preserved for
labor organizations created by and answerable only to workers. See 78 CONG. REc. 4229 (1934) (state-
ment of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HIsr. NLRA, supra note 34, at 25.
84. Some circuits have adopted an alternative approach to Section 8(a)(2) and Section 2(5) deter-
minations. For a more complete discussion of this approach, see infra notes 177-97 and accompanying
text.
85. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
86. See id. at 205.
87. See id. at 207.
88. See id. at 208.




The Supreme Court, however, declined to limit the definition of "deal-
ing with" an employer solely to activities that might amount to bargaining
with the employer.92 Instead, the Court held that if an organization ex-
isted-even if only in part-to discuss grievances or bargaining subjects
with an employer, then it was "dealing with" that employer and constituted
a labor organization.93
The Cabot Carbon Court declined to formulate an exhaustive list or a
bright line test of activities that would amount to dealing with an em-
ployer.94 The Court did indicate that an employer-created organization
would be "dealing with" the employer whenever discussions between the
two touched on the conditions of work. Subsequent NLRB and Court of
Appeals decisions, following Cabot Carbon, have held that employee com-
mittees created by employers during organizing drives are labor organiza-
tions,95 and that the lack of a constitution, by-laws, and dues will not
insulate an employee organization from a finding that it is a labor organiza-
tion.96 Thus, under Cabot Carbon and its progeny, "dealing with" an em-
ployer appears to include any interaction between employers and employee
organizations created by management regarding any issue that touches on
work conditions.
In NLRB v. Newport News Shipping and Dry Dock Co. , the Supreme
Court formulated objective, structural criteria to determine whether an em-
ployee organization was employer-dominated within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(2).9 8 The company had established employee representation
committees prior to the passage of NLRA in order to allow employees a
voice in the structuring of work conditions and to provide a means for
resolving labor-management differences.99 Employees overwhelmingly ap-
proved the committees in a referendum conducted by secret ballot."° The
Court found that neither the employer's intent nor the employees' wishes
were sufficient to prevent a finding of employer domination."10 Instead, the
Court held that the company violated Section 8(a)(2) because it determined
the form and structure of the committees and in so doing,"°2 "deprive[d] the
92. See id. at 211.
93. See id. at 213-14.
94. See id. at 211-13.
95. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. 400, 405, 407 (1987); Clappers Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 324,
334 (1970), enforced, 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972).
96. See Indiana Metal Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1953) (holding that a
lack of by-laws or a constitution may not shield an employer from a finding that an employee organiza-
tion is a statutory labor organization).
97. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
98. See id. at 247-48.
99. See id. at 244.
100. See id. at 248.
101. See id. at 251.
102. See id. at 249.
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employees of the complete freedom of action guaranteed to them by them
Act ... to choose such forms of organization as they wish."' 1
While the structural approach established in Newport News protects
employees' Section 7 rights" °3 by preventing employers from creating or
unilaterally imposing employer-selected forms of representation on employ-
ees, it arguably limits employee choice by foreclosing the possibility that
employees may choose to express their views through the medium of an
employee organization that does not enjoy complete structural autonomy
from management. In essence, therefore, the Newport News Court's inter-
pretation of Section 8(a)(2) leaves employees with a choice between in-
dependent union representation or no representation at all. In addition,
although the Court's refusal to consider the employer intent or employee
perceptions may be consistent with Senator Wagner's view that there is an
inherent contradiction in seeking to protect the freedom of employee choice
by enabling them to chose organizations that are not free, there is a latent
paternalism in this approach as well. Specifically, the Court's refusal to
base a finding of employer-domination on the subjective perceptions of
employees suggests that the Court did not trust the employees' understand-
ings of their own needs and interests and that the Court believed that em-
ployees were apt to make choices that do not serve their own interests. In
this respect, the structural approach, arguably, is inconsistent not only with
Section 7's affirmation of worker agency, but with its extension of the First
Amendment right of freedom of association to the employment
relationship. 105
Use of the structural approach to analyze modern El programs is par-
ticularly problematic. Specifically, Section 8(a)(2) could plausibly be in-
terpreted narrowly as simply an attempt to prohibit those types of employer-
dominated labor organizations that existed at the time the Act was
passed."° Modern El programs, however, are created for different reasons
103. Id. at 249-50. Irrespective of the employer's intentions, employee rejection of a management-
initiated program risks offending the employer who, by virtue of the nature of the employment relation-
ship, is in a position of power over employees. In this way, the presence of an EI-type program can
limit an employee's ability to choose freely which organizations will represent them. See Virk, supra
note 26, at 759-60.
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) ("Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and shall also have the right to refrain from any
and all of such activities except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 158(a)(3) of
this title.").
105. See Summers, supra note 45, at 697 (arguing that Section 7 of the NLRA and national labor
policy generally are "rooted in the first amendment right of freedom of association").
106. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1007 (1992). Member Raudabaugh argued that,
although Cabot Carbon could not be reinterpreted, the Taft-Hartley Act and, in particular, its emphasis
on employee choice, made it possible to reinterpret Newport News to permit a wider range of El pro-
grams to pass muster under Section 8(a)(2). For Raudabaugh, the answer to whether an EI program was
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and are based on a different set of assumptions."' Application of principles
of legal analysis developed to respond to the concerns of the 1930s, there-
fore, may distort the contours of contemporary labor law issues and result in
the law acting as an impediment to beneficial social change."' 8
II.
CONTEMPORARY El PROGRAMS AND THEIR UNCERTAIN
LEGAL STATUS
A. Contemporary E1 Programs
During the mid-1970s, several factors coalesced to cause many within
corporations to favor the adoption of El programs. The first was a belief
that American firms were losing their competitive edge in an increasingly
global market.'0 9 Employers and industrial relations experts attributed the
success of foreign competitors to the utilization of management strategies
designed to involve workers in the production process.110 In contrast, the
majority of firms in the United States still relied on industrial relations prac-
tices developed at the turn of the century by F.W. Taylor."' The
"Taylorized" workplace, characterized by rigid job classifications and the
concentration of authority in the hands of management, left employees with
little voice and no real stake in the success of the companies for which they
employer-dominated would hinge on the following factors, none of which he believed was dispositive:
the extent of employer involvement in the structure of the committee; whether employees from an
objective standpoint do not perceive El programs as a substitute for collective bargaining; whether
employees had been assured of their Section 7 right to select a union; and the employer's motivation.
See id. at 1013.
107. For a more complete discussion of the reasons behind the creation of modem day El programs,
see infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
108. For a discussion of an alternative approach utilized by some courts of appeals to analyze
Section 2(5) and Section 8(a)(2) questions, see infra notes 177-97 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 3, at 463; Kare, supra note 4, at 40, 59.
110. See generally 141 CONG. REC. E228 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fawell).
111. Taylor believed that talent and experience should reside with management and that manage-
ment should make all decisions about the deployment and utilization of resources. Taylor's system of
"scientific management" scheduled and routinized jobs to de-skill and cheapen the cost of labor. Man-
agement set rates at which work would be completed. Management also appropriated workers' knowl-
edge of the production process and separated conception from execution. Taylorized workplaces
motivated workers by means of bonus systems and piece rates, which were subject to change if workers
met or exceeded them too easily. The system of piece rates and bonuses sometimes pitted workers
against one another, thereby making it more difficult for workers to organize. Lipsky, supra note 24, at
670-71. For a general discussion of Taylorism, see HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPI-
TAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TwEnIETH CENTURY 124-39 (1974). Taylor is sometimes
contrasted with E.W. Demming, whose work in post-war Japan became the foundation of the total
quality approaches used in Japan and, more recently, in the United States. Until the advent of El, Dem-
ming's work was largely ignored in this country. See Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of
1997: Hearing of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources United States Senate on S. 295, 105th
Cong. 75 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing: TEAM Act of 1997] (statement of Samuel Estreicher, Law Profes-
sor); Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note 6, at 28 (statement of Mr.
Knicely); Hearing: TEAM Act of 1995, supra note 6, at 78 (statement of Mr. Knicely).
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worked. 112 The result was worker alienation, which in turn led to absentee-
ism, high turnover, widespread labor unrest, and poor product quality, all of
which had a significant negative impact on productivity.'13 To complicate
matters further, employers argued, collective bargaining, which had become
the staple of American industrial relations practice, locked employers and
employees alike into legalistic and adversarial modes of interaction, deny-
ing employers the flexibility they needed to respond to changing market
conditions.114 Finally, as the older manufacturing industries declined dur-
ing the seventies and eighties, power shifted from managers who were ac-
customed to hierarchical workplaces and the collective bargaining model to
managers who were more receptive to the new and innovative systems of
human resources management115 that were being developed at business
schools.
1 16
El embraces many different personnel management practices: some fo-
cus solely on production or quality issues, others are more concerned with
altering job structures to create conditions conducive to high productivity.
As a result, El is sometimes characterized not as a set program or way of
doing things but as a change in the corporate culture itself.117 The "culture"
of El is the product of a common core of assumptions-derived from moti-
vational and behavioral theories of organizational psychology-about em-
ployees and the nature of work." 8 Motivational theories assume that
individuals have strong growth needs that can be satisfied through the work
process.1 19 These needs also predispose individuals to be hardworking and
committed to the goals of the firm. 12° Behavioral science theories, con-
versely, focus on the questions of what kinds of job characteristics and
workplaces are most conducive to the creation of a highly motivated, pro-
ductive work force.' 2 ' For behavioral science theorists, a good job is one
that combines a high degree of feedback, task variety, challenge, and oppor-
tunities to learn new skills. 122 The marriage of behavioral theory and moti-
vational theory is embodied in the workplace with considerable employee
112. See e.g., Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note 6, at 28
(statement of Mr. Knicely); Hearing: TEAM Act of 1995, supra note 6, at 78 (statement of Mr. Knicely).
113. See DERBER, supra note 39, at 54.
114. See KOCHAN, ET AL., supra note 50, at 93; Klare, supra note 4, at 59.
115. See KocHAN, ET AL., supra note 50, at 79.
116. See Jack Metzgar, Employee Involvement Programs and the Philosophy of Labor, 39 DissENr
67, 69-70 (1992) (noting that El is the product of critiques of top-down management in the 1970s by
members of the Harvard Business School and MIT).
117. See Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note 6, at 29-30 (state-
ment of Mr. Knicely); Hearing: TEAM Act of 1995, supra note 6, at 78-79 (statement of Mr. Knicely).






involvement and employee participation in management decision-
making.'
23
In keeping with this more collaborative and hence more cooperative
conception of the workplace, many El programs diffuse authority and deci-
sion-making throughout the organization or reduce status distinctions be-
tween labor and management.1 24  Because work within the El mode is a
cooperative process, conflict in the employment relationship is not inevita-
ble. Instead, conflict is pathological, a symptom of interpersonal misunder-
standings, which can be overcome through discussion and reassertion of the
mutual interests of labor and management.'
2 5
Although EI programs are generally initiated and structured by man-
agement, El programs have functioned successfully in unionized work-
places.' 26  Union leaders see El as a potential means of enhancing the
firm's competitiveness, but tensions often exist between management and
union leaders' competing conceptions of the impact of El on the social rela-
tions of the workplace. Management tends to see El as a means of provid-
ing workers with more job satisfaction, a benefit that will bear fruit in the
form of increased productivity. Labor leaders, on the other hand, tend to
conceptualize El as a means of fostering industrial democracy by providing
workers with a voice at all levels of decision-making.'
27
El programs often evolve and change focus over time to encompass
aspects of workplace life not included in their original mandates. 128 In ad-
dition, employers tend to experiment with El approaches, continually adopt-
ing and adapting practices to meet the needs of the moment.' 2 9 The protean
nature of El programs, coupled with the variety of El approaches, make it
difficult to draw fine analytical distinctions between different types of El
programs. 3' Nonetheless, El programs tend to fall into three broad catego-
123. See DraLo, COMM'N FACr-FINDING REP., supra note 2, at 34, 37.
124. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 508.
125. See id. at 517.
126. See id. at 510.
127. The AFL-CIO's version of partnership between labor and management in El programs in-
cludes giving decision-making power to employees, redesigning jobs so that workers perform a variety
of skills, transforming the role of managers so that workers become self managers, and having decision-
making at all levels of the enterprise. See, e.g., Most Companies are Prepared to Engage in Partnership
with Unions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at AA-1 (1995). But see Kohler, supra note 5, at 505
(noting that non-union employers sometimes use El to avoid union organizing).
128. See Hearing: TEAM Act of 1997, supra note 111, at 112 (statement of the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers) (noting that "[t]eams continue to evolve, where they currently exist, to fit the
specific needs of each work force" and cautioning that "rigid prescriptive guidelines for the composition
and operation of teams will greatly diminish the effectiveness of teams as they seek workplace
improvements").
129. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 503.
130. In addition, questions involving the production process cannot easily be separated from ques-
tions involving the terms and conditions of employment; thus, some commentators believe that "[i]t is
impossible to separate conditions of work from employee involvement." Hearing: Legal Problems with
Employee Involvement Programs, supra note 20, at 90 (statement of Richard S. Wellins).
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ries: production- and quality-centered initiatives, job enrichment and rede-
sign programs, and workplace committees and partnerships.
Quality circles epitomize the production- and quality-centered ap-
proach. In the quality circle model, supervisors regularly review employee
suggestions for improving quality and efficiency.' Quality circles gener-
ally have between six and twelve members, all of whom receive at least
some training in problem-solving techniques and group dynamics.
132
Total quality management (TQM) is another type of production-cen-
tered initiative in which team members also discuss and formulate solutions
to problems which sometimes implicate human resources practices and pol-
icies. 13 3 In contrast to the quality circle model which does not alter tradi-
tional status distinctions between labor and management, TQM deliberately
blurs distinctions between employees and managers by downplaying status
differences between the two groups and by assigning employees some man-
agerial tasks. 134 TQM programs have also tended to evolve into forums for
discussion of a wide range of issues not limited to production or quality.' 35
Job enrichment and redesign programs experiment with methods of
work organization presumed to be more appealing to employees and better
capable of meeting their needs for fulfillment and personal growth. 136 Job
enrichment programs combine tasks, allowing workers to perform more
complex operations and to use a variety of different skills.'3 7 Job redesign
programs, on the other hand, elicit worker input on ways to set the work
pace. These programs may also redesign traditional assembly line tech-
niques to make workers responsible for assembling an entire product.
138
Semi-autonomous and self-managed work teams represent more so-
phisticated forms of job redesign. Semi-autonomous work teams may be
responsible not only for structuring jobs but for a number of personnel
functions traditionally performed by management. 139 Teams often make
hiring decisions, generally from a list of approved candidates provided by
management. They may also develop criteria for pay increases." In the
self-managed work team, on the other hand, team members may be made
131. See Nealia S. Bruning and Patrick R. Liverpool, Membership in Quality Circles and Participa-
tion in Decision Making, 29 J. OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 76, 77 (1993).
132. See id. at 77.
133. See DuNLOP COMM'N FACT-FINDING REP., supra note 2, at 37.
134. See Goldin, supra note 7, at 434-36.
135. See id. at 434.
136. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 506-07; Cochran, supra note 3, at 463.
137. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 507.
138. See id.
139. As early as 1977, TRW experimented with semi-autonomous work teams. The company de-
centralized decision-making to the shop floor and workers participated in scheduling production, as-
signing work, monitoring production and scrap levels, determining overtime requirements, providing
feedback to teams, and making hiring and promotion decisions. KocHAN, ET AL., supra note 50, at 96-
97.
140. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 508.
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responsible for all aspects of the production process as well as for hiring,
firing, and setting basic personnel policies for the group. Leadership may
also rotate from one team member to another. 141
Workplace committees and partnerships are cooperative ventures in
which employees and managers meet to discuss mutual goals and shared
concerns. Like job redesign groups, these committees, sometimes referred
to as quality of work-life groups, deal with a variety of topics that fre-
quently move beyond production or health and safety concerns into issues
of worker satisfaction.
1 42
B. Legal Status of El Programs
The principal legal difficulty with management-initiated El programs,
particularly those in non-union workplaces, is that it is often difficult to
draw distinctions between the groups' permissible discussion of production
issues and their impermissible discussion of employment practices, involv-
ing questions of wages, hours, and conditions of work.143 This difficulty,
when combined with management design and/or initiation of El programs,
suggests that many El programs would meet Section 8(a)(2)'s definition of
an employer-dominated labor organization.
Recognizing that modem El programs in non-union workplaces may
violate the NLRA, employers argue that the solution lies in reform of the
NLRA, not in the redesign of El programs." For employers, the NRLA is
based upon an adversarial conception of labor relations that has no rele-
vance to the realities of the new cooperative corporate culture.'45 The Act
is thus archaic, an impediment not only to the proliferation of innovative




The Electromation case has served as a flashpoint for employer antag-
onism to the NLRA. t47 In Electromation, the NLRB and the Seventh Cir-
cuit, following the Cabot Carbon/Newport News approach, held that four-
141. See DUNLOP COMM'N. FAcr-FINDiNc REP., supra note 2, at 38.
142. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 508-09.
143. See PATRICK HARDEN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1-11 (3rd ed.) (1992); DuNLOP COMM'N
FACT-FINDING REP., supra note 2, at 38.
144. For an articulation of this argument, see infra notes 365-66 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text.
146. See 141 CONG. REC. H9525 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fawell) (arguing that
the NLRA definition of labor organization is "fossilized" and that it "collid[es] head-on with dynamic
new concepts of doing business in today's fast evolving, information-centered economy and society").
See also Moe, supra note 62, at 1145 (arguing that although the Board's interpretation of Section 8(a)(2)
may have helped to eradicate company unions, it is not well adapted to modem forms of participatory
management, which are dissimilar to and less threatening than the company unions of the 1930's).
147. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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employee "action committees" established by the company in response to
employee dissatisfaction with changes in the company's bonus system were
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) and that they were
employer-dominated within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2)."' 8 The Board
recognized that it was possible for employee committees to function as
communications devices without becoming labor organizations; the diffi-
culty lay in distinguishing between the two functions.14 9 According to the
Board, an employee committee is a labor organization if it meets the fol-
lowing criteria: employees participate in the organization; the organization
exists at least in part to deal with management; and those dealings concern
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, and/or hours of employ-
ment.15° The Board held that all of the action committees, with the excep-
tion of the no smoking policy committee, which had never met, satisfied all
three prongs of its test. The committees involved employees in attempts to
solve company-wide problems, the involvement occurred through a process
of bilateral communication between labor and management, and the discus-
sions dealt at least to some extent with conditions of work.' 5' This pattern
of bilateral communication amounted to "dealing with" the employer within
the meaning of both Section 8(a)(2) and Section 2(5) as interpreted in
Cabot Carbon.152 The Board also held that the committees were employer-
dominated because the employer unilaterally established the committees,
defined their functions, set their agenda, selected some of the employee
representatives to the committees, paid employees for their committee
work, and could terminate the committees at will.' 53 In the Board's view,
this kind of structural dependence amounted to precisely the type of com-
pany unionism that Section 8(a)(2) was meant to eliminate.' 5" Also in
keeping with Newport News, the Board held that even though the company
disbanded the committees when an organizing drive began, a factor indicat-
ing the absence of anti-union animus, neither the employer's nor the em-
ployees' intent was relevant in the Board's Section 8(a)(2)
determinations. 155
Although the Board limited its decision to the facts of the case and
made no attempt to rule on the issue of El programs generally,156 its hold-
ing that the committees were labor organizations and that the employer vio-
148. See id. at 998. The five actions committees were Absenteeism and Infractions, No Smoking
Policy, Communications Network, Pay Progression for Premium Positions, Attendance, and Bonus Pro-
gram. See id. at 991.
149. See id. at 990.
150. See id. at 994.
151. See id. at 997.




156. See id. at 990.
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lated Section 8(a)(2) could arguably be applied to other similarly structured
El programs.1 57
The Electromation decision thus creates a number of legal difficulties
for EI programs. The majority of El programs are created by or for em-
ployers who then introduce the programs into the workplace. 58 In many El
programs, particularly those that deal with quality of work-life issues, em-
ployees act as representatives for the group. The concept of the cooperative
work team also necessitates considerable employer-employee interaction
and perhaps even discussion of statutory bargaining topics. Under the Elec-
tromation rationale, then, virtually all El programs could be deemed em-
ployer-dominated labor organizations, with the possible exceptions of
quality circles that confine discussion solely to product quality and self-
managed work teams which enjoy complete structural autonomy from
management.
Electromation and subsequent decisions indicate that the Board has
remained faithful to the structural approach.159 For example, in E.L du
Pont de Nemours & Co.,16 the Board applied the Electromation rationale
to a unionized workplace, holding that the company violated Section 8(a)(2)
by unilaterally initiating and administering seven-employee committees.
161
The committees engaged in discussions with and made proposals to man-
agement on matters involving conditions of work. 162 The Board held that
although isolated instances of employee-management communication
would not necessarily render an employee committee a labor organization, a
committee constitutes a labor organization if it functions as a means for
regular, bilateral communication between employees and management.
1 63
As was the case in Electromation, the committees were employer-domi-
nated because management created the committees, determined their struc-
ture and agenda, and participated in the decision-making process.4
157. See id.
158. See Dun oa COMM'N FAcr-FINDING RP., supra note 2, at 50.
159. See, e.g., V & S Proglav, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 144 (1997); Aero Detroit, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B.
1101, 1105 (1996); Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. 1245, 1250-52 (1995); Keeler Brass Automative Group,
317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1118 (1995); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 1154, 1156 (1995); Webcor
Packing Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203, 1210 (1995); Gamey Morris, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 101, 102 (1993); Salt
Lake Div., A Div. Of Waste Mgt. Of Utah, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 883 (1993).
160. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
161. See id. at 893.
162. See id. at 895.
163. See id. at 894.
164. See id. at 910-18. The Board followed a similar line of reasoning in several additional cases,
all of which also involved the unilateral creation by management of employee committees. In Keeler
Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1115-16 (1995), the Board held that employer-structured
grievance committees violated Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). The committees were employer-dominated
because management determined the grievance committees' procedures and composition. See id. at
1115-16. See also Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. 1245, 1251 (1995) (holding that where an El program in
which employee committees present proposals about working conditions in the form of "may we" or
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Similarly, in Peninsula General Hospital and Medical Center,16 5 the Board
found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(2) when it elicited grievances
from groups designed to discuss the nursing practice. The Fourth Circuit,
however, reversed, holding that the groups were not labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) because discussions involved irregular
contact with management, rather than a pattern or practice of dealing with
the employer. 166 Because the groups were not labor organizations, they did
not violate Section 8(a)(2).
1 67
2. Possible Exceptions to the Cabot Carbon/Newport News Approach
a. Section 2(5) Issues: The NLRB Approach
The structural approach does provide some safe harbors for El pro-
grams. Board decisions prior to Electromation had held that where all em-
ployees deal with the employer as a "committee of the whole," no statutory
labor organization existed.1 68 In addition, the Board has held that manage-
ment-appointed committees which are delegated the authority to make final
decisions on grievances are not labor organizations, if those organizations
exercised authority independent of management and did not interact with
management either during their deliberations or when they rendered their
final decisions.169 These pre-Electromation cases do not widen the parame-
ters of permissible activity for El programs, nor do they undermine Cabot
"will the employer permit," which the employer may veto, those committees will be considered labor
organizations).
165. 312 N.L.R.B. 582 (1993), reversed, 36 F.3d 1262, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994).
166. NLRB v. Peninsula General Hospital Medical Center, 36 F.3d 1262, 1274 (4th Cir. 1994).
167. See id. at 1274.
168. See, e.g., General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977). The employee structures at
issue in the case were employer-created job enrichment teams. These teams comprised the entire bar-
gaining unit. Their function was to meet and discuss operational matters. See id. at 1233. Despite the
fact that the teams did discuss conditions of employment, the Board held that the teams were not labor
organizations because they did not have an agency relationship with the employees; instead, the bargain-
ing unit functioned as a "committee of the whole." Id. at 1234. As a result, all that occurred was a "staff
meeting or the factory equivalent thereof." Id.
169. See Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (1977), enforced in part sub. nom. NLRB v.
Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an "Employees' Council" created by
management to render final decisions on grievances was not a labor organization because it did not deal
with management except to render final decisions on grievances); Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp., 231
N.L.R.B. 1108, 1121 (1977) (holding that employer-created employee committees established to hear
grievances and empowered to render final decisions on them were not labor organizations because the
committees simply gave "employees a voice in resolving the grievances of their fellow employees"; this
activity did not amount to "dealing with" the employer). For post-Electromation clarification of em-
ployer/employee interactions which do not amount to "dealing with" the employer, see E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Company, 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993) (noting that no "dealing with" an employer occurs
where a "committee makes no proposals to the employer, and the employer simply gathers the informa-
tion and does what it wishes with such information"). Thus, according to the Board, a brainstorming
session would not be "dealing with" an employer, provided the purpose of the session was to gather
information. See id. Similarly, a suggestion box used by employees to make proposals to management
is not "dealing with" because the "proposals are made individually and not as a group." See id.
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Carbon.17 ° They merely provide authority to support the proposition that
self-managed work teams and other forms of El that are structurally in-
dependent of management and are permissible under current law.
Several cases decided after Electromation, however, suggest greater
willingness on the Board's part to adopt a more lenient approach to Section
2(5) questions, similar to that used by the Fourth Circuit in Peninsula Gen-
eral.t71 In Stoody Company Div. of Thermadyne,172 the Board held that an
employer-created handbook committee designed to gather information
about handbook policies inconsistent with current practices was not a statu-
tory labor organization because the committee did not engage in a pattern or
practice of making proposals to the employer. 73 In Vons Grocery,74 a
quality circle created by the company to discuss operational concerns later
expanded its focus to discussions of the company's dress code and accident
system and made proposals to both the company and the union. The Board
declined to find that the quality circle had become a labor organization,
holding instead that communication between the quality circle and the em-
ployer was "incidental" to the group's purpose and not indicative of a pat-
tern or practice of dealings with the employer over Section 2(5) issues.
175
The exceptions to the Electromation rule carved out in recent decisions do
not represent a retreat from the Board's position that employee committees
dealing with conditions of work must be structurally independent of man-
agement to avoid violating Section 8(a)(2). But the Board's decisions may
reflect a recognition that even though some discussion of conditions of
work in production-centered groups will probably occur, such discussions
do not necessarily turn a quality circle into a labor organization.'
76
b. Alternatives to the Structural Approach
The view that the adversarial model of labor relations has become an
anachronism is central to an alternative judicial approach to Section 2(5)
and Section 8(a)(2) issues. This alternative approach, often referred to as
the Permissive or Free Choice approach, adopts a more lenient posture to-
ward employer-created employee organizations and reaches results that
170. See supra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
172. 320 N.L.R.B. 18, 19 (1995). The committee met only once and was disbanded when the
employer learned that a union attempting to organize the company had filed a § 8(a)(2) complaint about
the committee. See id.
173. See id. at 20-21.
174. 320 N.L.R.B. 53, 54 (1995).
175. See id. at 54.
176. In both Vons Grocery, 320 N.L.R.B. at 53-54, and Stoody Company, 320 N.L.R.B. at 20-21,
the Board relied on E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993) to find that the
committees had not engaged in a pattern or practice of dealing with the employer and that the groups did
not exist for the purpose of following such a pattern or practice.
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contradict in important ways the Supreme Court's teachings in Cabot Car-
bon and Newport News.'7 7
The Sixth Circuit has taken the lead in formulating a more permissive
approach to Section 2(5) questions. Under this approach, employee percep-
tions that an employer-sponsored committee is not a labor organization,
coupled with absence of anti-union animus, will generally shield the com-
mittee from a finding that it is a labor organization.
17 8
Within the context of Free Choice jurisprudence's analysis of Section
8(a)(2) questions, the primary purpose of the NLRA was to foster labor-
management cooperation.' 79 While this is a plausible reading of the Act's
legislative history, 80 the permissive approach is premised on an assumption
that finds virtually no support in the Act's legislative history-that em-
ployer-created labor organizations have only the potential to dominate em-
ployees.1 81 If such organizations present only the potential for domination,
it follows that the Act cannot absolutely preclude employee choice of, or
participation in, labor organizations created or supported by an employer. 1
82
177. The seminal case for this more permissive approach is Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). The term "free choice" was first used to describe this approach in Hertzka
& Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
178. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 289 (6th Cir.
1982), holding that several employer-initiated committees designed to enable employees to communi-
cate with management about company plans and programs and to identify problems and propose solu-
tions were not labor organizations. The company had not introduced the committees during an
organizational drive, and thus, in the court's view, it had not displayed anti-union animus. See Virk,
supra note 26, at 758. The court went on to hold that continuous rotation of committee representatives
rendered discussions between employee representatives and management more akin to a forum for indi-
vidual communication with management. Also relevant to the court's analysis was the fact that there
was a general recognition among employees that the committees were not labor organizations. See
Streamway, 691 F.2d at 294-95.
179. See Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 167 (noting that the purpose of the NLRA is to facilitate
cooperation between labor and management); Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th
Cir. 1967) (holding that a labor-management cooperative program furthered the primary purpose of the
NLRA to create industrial peace).
180. See 78 CONG. REc. 4229 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in LEG. HIST. NLRA,
supra note 34, at 22 ("The constant readjustments necessary to strike a fair balance between industry
and labor cannot be accomplished simply by code revisions or by general exhortations.").
181. The thrust of Senator Wagner's analysis of company unions was that such equality and free-
dom could never exist within the context of a company-dominated labor organization. See generally
supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. For a discussion of actual versus potential domination, see
Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 167-168; Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir.
1968).
182. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214 (1st Cir. 1979) (recognizing
"some room for management-employee cooperation short of domination"); Hertzka & Knowles, 503
F.2d at 630 (noting that under a strict interpretation of Section 8(a)(2), "almost any form of employer
cooperation, however innocuous, could be deemed 'support' or 'interference.' Yet such a myopic read-
ing of Section 8(a)(2) would undermine its very purpose and the purpose of the Act as a whole.").
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The critical question becomes whether an employee organization is actually
dominated by the employer.' 83
For the Free Choice Circuits, domination is a subjective phenomenon,
determined by examining whether employees themselves believe that they
have been deprived of their freedom to choose who will represent them.
18 4
Employee perceptions of the nature and function of employer-created labor
organizations, therefore, are central to the Free Choice Circuits' analyses of
Section 8(a)(2). 85 Accordingly, if under the totality of the circumstances,
viewed from the perspective of employees, an employer has interfered with
employees' freedom to choose their representatives, the employer will have
violated Section 8(a)(2).' 8 6 The fact that an employee organization is rela-
tively weak when compared with formal unions,1 87 or that an employer pro-
vides the organization with financial support of various kinds, t 88 does not
necessarily mean that an employee organization is employer-dominated.
Nor will employer participation in or structuring of an employee organiza-
tion lead inexorably to a finding of domination. t89 As long as the labor
organization "exists only as the result of a choice freely made by employ-
ees, in their own interests, and without regard to the desires of their em-
ployer," it will not violate Section 8(a)(2).' 9 °
Although it is possible that El programs would fare better under the
Free Choice approach than they have under the structural approach, in all of
183. See NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1213 (adopting the requirement of actual domi-
nation); Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 167; Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204; NLRB v. Homemaker
Shops Inc., 724 F.2d 535, 544 (6th Cir. 1984).
184. See, e.g., Homemaker Shops, 724 F.2d at 545; Coppus Engineering v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564,
571-73 (5th Cir. 1957); Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 168; NLRB v. Sharples Chemicals, 209 F.2d 645,
652 (6th Cir. 1954); Federal-Mogul Corp., 394 F.2d at 918.
185. See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 631 (holding that management participation on
committees which represented employees was not an indication of employer domination because em-
ployees were not dissatisfied with managerial participation); Modem Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204 (holding
that an employer-created employee committee was not employer-dominated because, inter alia, employ-
ees had shown no dissatisfaction with the way in which the committees represented them); Chicago
Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 165 (noting that continued employee committee functioning in the face of with-
drawn company support indicated that during negotiations with the company, the committees had be-
come independent labor organizations).
186. See Federal-Mogul Corp., 394 F.2d at 917; Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1213-14; NLRB
v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1954); Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 168; Sharples Chemicals,
209 F.2d at 652; Modem Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204.
187. See Federal-Mogul Corp., 394 F.2d at 918; Modem Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204.
188. See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1213.
189. See id. at 1214 (declining to infer "subtle domination" from management attendance at em-
ployer committee meetings); Homemaker Shops, 724 F.2d at 545-46 (employer's involvement in com-
mittee elections evidence of cooperation and not per se unlawful where committees enjoyed support of
employees); Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 169 (company's permitting employee committees to hold
elections for shop committeemen on company time, company's supervising elections present only the
potential for domination where employee organization enjoyed support of employees and functioned in
the court's opinion as a labor union); Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 631 (management participation in
employee committee meetings not domination where idea originated with employees).
190. See Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 630 (citing Wemyss, 212 F.2d at 471).
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the Free Choice cases discussed above, the employee committees in ques-
tion enjoyed considerable employee support. In several cases, the unfair
labor practices charges were brought not by disgruntled employees but by
outside unions which had lost certification elections.' 9 ' In addition, a
number of those employee organizations engaged in collective bargaining
and were formally recognized by the company and the Board as the em-
ployees' exclusive representatives.1 92 It is by no means certain, therefore,
that a Free Choice court would find an El program introduced and struc-
tured by management per se permissible.
Nonetheless, by shifting the focus of analysis to employee perceptions,
the Free Choice approach alters and expands the parameters of legal analy-
sis of El programs. First, the Free Choice approach broadens the realm of
employee choice to include employer-created EI programs, provided those
programs do not stifle employee choice or freedom of expression. 193 In so
doing, the Free Choice approach eliminates much of the paternalism of the
structural approach.' 94 Second, by making the wishes of employees rather
than the structure of a committee dispositive, the Free Choice approach per-
mits courts to give voice to the Act's emphasis on promoting worker
agency and to recognize that it is possible for the underlying character of
labor relations to change over time.' 95 But, despite its strengths, the Free
Choice approach ignores Cabot Carbon and Newport News entirely. 96 It is
difficult to understand why the Supreme Court has permitted two such fun-
damentally contradictory approaches to co-exist within the corpus of Sec-
tion 2(5) and Section 8(a)(2) jurisprudence.' 97 However, given the apparent
conflict between the Supreme Court's approach and the Free Choice ap-
191. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul, 394 F.2d at 917; Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 202; Chicago Raw-
hide, 221 F.2d at 167-68; Homemaker Shops, 724 F.2d at 538. See also Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at
1212 (members of employee committee had previously voted out an AFL-CIO union).
192. See Homemaker Shops, 724 F.2d at 539 (despite absence of "hard bargaining" on part of
employee committee negotiators, committee and employer had negotiated two collective bargaining
agreements); Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 168-69 (employee committee represented majority of em-
ployees and had worked to resolve many employee grievances); Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1212
(although the employee committee had not negotiated a formal collective bargaining agreement, it had
proposed and obtained university consent for paid personal leave and improved medical benefits). See
also Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204 (court deemed relevant the fact that some committees held private
sessions to prepare for grievance adjudications and salary negotiations).
193. See Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 631 ("Where a cooperative arrangement reflects a choice
freely arrived at and where the organization is capable of being a meaningful avenue for the expression
of employee wishes, we find it unobjectionable under the Act.").
194. For further discussion, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1214 ("[C]hanging conditions in the labor-manage-
ment field seem to have strengthened the case for providing room for cooperative employer-employee
arrangements as alternatives to the traditional adversary model.").
196. See Lipsky, supra note 24, at 720.
197. The Supreme Court has never heard a Free Choice case. See, e.g. Hertzka & Knowles v.
NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975). Kohler has argued that the
subjective test for domination is tantamount to judicial repeal of Section 8(a)(2). See Kohler, supra note
5, at 545.
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proach, both the utility and the feasibility of reliance on the Free Choice
model is at best questionable.
C. Official Responses to El Programs and Their Uncertain Legal Status
A general consensus appears to exist in political circles that El pro-
grams are good for American business. Even though the Clinton Adminis-
tration has opposed the TEAM Act,' 98 both the President and former
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich have been vocal in their support for EI and
their wish to see El programs expanded.' 99 The Department of Labor has
urged employers to introduce El programs. 2" In 1995, Congress passed the
Workers Technology Skill Development Act, which provides grants to help
identify and spread information about superior El programs.2 ° t
Perhaps the most influential endorsement of EI, albeit a qualified one,
has come from the Dunlop Commission, a blue ribbon panel appointed in
1993 by President Clinton to study the state of labor-management rela-
tions .2°  The Commission was chaired by former Secretary of Labor John
T. Dunlop and was charged with recommending changes in work practices
to increase labor-management cooperation and employee participation in
the workplace. 2 3 The Commission held eleven meetings in Washington,
D.C. and six regional meetings, hearing from members of the labor, busi-
ness, and academic communities with regard to steps that might be taken to
improve the current state of employee-management relations. 2°' The Com-
mission concluded that it was in the national interest to promote the expan-
sion of El programs.
205
The Commission recognized that some El programs currently in opera-
tion may violate Section 8(a)(2). 2 6 But the Commission's endorsement of
the need for legal change was qualified and reflected an awareness that El
198. See, e.g., Employee Participation: Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite Pleas from Business for
Passage, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at d-4 (July 31, 1996). In his veto message, the President
noted that the TEAM Act would result in the reintroduction of company unions and that "current law
provides for 'a wide variety of cooperative workplace efforts."' Id.
199. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, The Pronoun Test for Success, WASH. POST, (July 28, 1993) (noting
that the high performance workplace is organized from the bottom up).
200. See Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note 6, at 32 (state-
ment of Mr. Knicely); Hearing: TEAM Act of 1995, supra note 6, at 80 (statement of Mr. Knicely).
201. Pub. L. No. 103-382.
202. See Dunlop Panel Urged to Examine Full Range of Employment Law: Republican Members
of the House Education and Labor Committee Have Urged the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations Not to Limit Itself to Perceived Problems With the National Labor Relations Act
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programs could infringe on employees' collective bargaining rights.2 7 The
Commission recommended that Congress clarify Section 8(a)(2) and that
the NLRB interpret it in a manner which insures that El programs in which
discussion of conditions of work are incidental to the group's larger pur-
pose do not run afoul of the NLRA.2 °8 But the Commission also made it
clear that El programs should not be confused with independent union rep-
resentation. Thus, the commission recommended that Congress clarify Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) to accommodate El programs that dealt with topics such as
safety, quality, or dispute resolution as long as such clarification did not
lead to the reintroduction of company unions.209 In addition, the Commis-
sion recommended that it be an unfair labor practice for employers to estab-
lish El programs or to manipulate existing El programs for the purpose of
frustrating employees' exercise of their collective bargaining rights.210 It
also recommended that issues normally dealt with in collective bargaining
should not be discussed in El groups without the union's consent.21 Fi-
nally, the Commission concluded that employees in El programs should be
accorded the same legal protections against employer retaliation for expres-
sing opinions on workplace issues that workers protected by the NLRA
enjoy. 21 2 The Commission, thus, at most offered a qualified endorsement
of El programs.
Ell.
WELFARE CAPITALISM AND CONTEMPORARY E
The Dunlop Commission's qualified endorsement of El programs and
its reiteration of the need to guard against the danger of El programs in-
fringing on workers' collective bargaining rights reflect its recognition that
El programs have the potential to function in a manner inconsistent with
values the nation's labor law aims to protect. When a program's potential
to have adverse effects is an issue, debate often proceeds from the assump-
tion that insight can best be gained by drawing analogies between the in-
stant issue and similar historical developments.
In debates over El, analogies are most frequently drawn between El
programs and the company unions of the 1930s. But important differences
exist between El and company unions.213 While the company unions of the
1930s bargained with employers over wages and conditions of work, mod-
207. See id. at 8.
208. See id. This approach is similar to that used by the Board in Vons Grocery, 320 N.L.R.B. 53
(1995) and Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995). For discussion of these cases, see supra notes 172-76
and accompanying text.
209. DuNLOP COMM'N.: FiNAL REP., supra note 205, at 7.
210. See id. at 9.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 8.
213. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text for a description of company unions; supra
notes 117-42 and accompanying text for a description of El programs.
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em El programs focus on issues of quality or productivity. The company
unions grew up in hierarchically-structured, Taylorized workplaces,
whereas a goal of many El programs is to "flatten" organizational struc-
tures. Prospects for employee participation in the decentralized, non-hierar-
chical El workplaces may therefore be much greater than was the case in
the company union workplaces of the 1920s and 1930s.2 14 Finally, and
most significantly, the company unions of the 1930s were ad hoc responses
designed to undermine traditional unions and to circumvent legal protec-
tions accorded to collective bargaining. El, conversely, is the outgrowth of
a philosophy of industrial relations that seeks to alter the basic foundations
of labor management relations.21 5 The broader, systemic focus of El sug-
gests that the relevant question is whether El, as a philosophy of industrial
relations, is capable of creating more democratic workplaces.
In resolving this question, the appropriate comparison is not between
El and company unions but between El and welfare capitalism, the only
other well developed expression of a management-initiated cooperative ap-
proach to labor-management relations in modem American history.
A. Welfare Capitalism
Although nearly seventy years of history separate welfare capitalism
and El,2 16 the similarities between the two are striking. Like modem El,
welfare capitalism assumed a variety of forms,2 t7 ranging from the provi-
sion of company housing to the establishment of YMCAs to the creation of
adult education programs devoted to "Americanizing" immigrant work-
ers. 218 More advanced forms of welfare capitalism included the creation of
employee profit-sharing or stock purchase plans.
The motivations of employers who introduced welfare programs were
as diverse as the programs themselves. First, as is the case in contemporary
El programs, concerns about declining productivity played a major role in
the decision to adopt welfare programs. For example, turnover rates during
the 1920s often exceeded one hundred percent, necessitating continuous
hiring and training of new personnel and reducing efficiency.21 9 Compa-
nies also instituted welfare programs as public relations moves. During the
214. See generally supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
215. See generally supra notes 117-42 and accompanying text.
216. In the 1920's, significant numbers of employers began welfare programs. See BRODY, supra
note 37, at 49-54. For discussions of welfare practices in individual firms between the late 1880's and
1930, see ROBERT OZANNE, A CENTURY OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AT INTERNATIONAL HAR-
VESTER (1967); GERALD ZAHAVI, WORKERS, MANAGERS, AND WELFARE CAPITALISM: THE
SHOEWORKERS AND TANNERS OF ENDICOTT JOHNSON 1890-1950 (1988).
217. See H.M. Gittleman, Welfare Capitalism Reconsidered, 33 LABOR HISTORY 5, 9 (1982).
218. See STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM, 1880-1940, at 11-12 (company
housing); id. at 14-15 (YMCA's); id. at 59-60 (use of welfare programs to Americanize immigrants).
219. See, e.g., LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO 1919-
1939, at 171 (1990).
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first decade of the twentieth century, the trusts sought to escape regulation
by publicizing the beneficial functions they performed in society.220 Wel-
fare activities, thus, served as a powerful tool in the public relations arse-
nals of large companies. Idealism also played a role in the introduction of
welfare programs. 2 Some employers, troubled by the dichotomy between
political democracy and workplace authoritarianism, sought to establish
harmonious, equitable social relations in the workplace.2 22 Finally, anti-
unionism was also a significant factor in the decision to adopt welfare pro-
grams. While some companies' welfare programs were direct responses to
labor unrest and previous union activity, other companies tried to "inocu-
late" their workforces against the threat of unionism, using welfare pro-
grams to create conditions just as good if not better than those of union
shops.223 Welfare activities thus served as a means for employers to ad-
dress firm- or industry-specific concerns as well as larger economic, social,
and even political concerns. Although it would be tempting to ascribe a
single set of motivations to each firm, as is the case in modern El programs,
the motives for introducing welfare work probably interacted to shape the
policies of a given company or corporate officer.
1. Welfare Capitalism as a Philosophy of Industrial Relations
Historians generally have viewed welfare capitalism negatively, argu-
ing that the primary purpose of welfare programs was to enable employers
to preserve their dominance and independence in the face of threats from
organized labor.22 4 Indeed, there is ample evidence to support this view.
The Stetson Company, for example, used a Christmas bonus to stave off a
union drive in 1901.225 Nonetheless, although welfare activities were use-
ful to employers in reducing labor unrest or in improving the image of the
company, like modem EI, welfare capitalism was too complex a movement
to be explained solely in terms of anti-unionism.
2 26
220. See NEIL J. MrrcHELL, THE GENEROUS CORPORATION: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC
PowER 94-99 (1989).
221. BRODY, supra note 37, at 55, 58-59 (discussing employer idealism and employee representa-
tion and one welfare capitalist's view that employees needed to be treated like thinking men).
222. See MITCHELL, supra note 220, at 118-19; IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933, at 165 (1960); A. LINCOLN FILENE, A MERCHANT's HORIZON
89 (1924).
223. See BRODY, supra note 37, at 57; OzANNE, supra note 216, at 70. See also BRANDES, supra
note 218, at 32, 127.
224. See BRANDES, supra note 218, at 32. Bernstein also argues that the "central purpose of welfare
capitalism [was] the avoidance of trade unions." BERNSTEIN, supra note 222, at 187. For discussions of
the prominence of anti-unionism in welfare capitalist thought, see OzANE, supra note 216, at 116-24
(detailing the relationship between labor unrest and welfare programs at International Harvester).
225. See OzANNE, supra note 216, at 33. U.S. Steel similarly "carefully blended coercion with
inducement" in the form of welfare benefits to clear the company of unions. See ROBERT H. WIEBE,
BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 165 (1962).
226. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 219, at 160-61 (arguing that welfare capitalists wanted a "benign
industrial society").
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The end of cutthroat competition that accompanied the concentration
of power in the hands of large corporations contributed to the development
of welfare capitalism, enabling employers to devote more time and effort to
developing the "human factor in industry." '227 But an equally important fac-
tor in the decision to adopt welfare programs may have been the considera-
ble pressure businessmen faced to legitimize the activities of large
corporations both to the broader society and to themselves.2 ' The sharp
business practices of the trusts, growing class divisions, and violent labor
unrest resulted in increasing public criticism and scrutiny of the large cor-
porations raised the specter of government regulation, and placed additional
pressure on businessmen to justify their actions and prove that large corpo-
rations could play a constructive role in society.229
Welfare capitalists shared an underlying core of beliefs about the na-
ture of business activity and the employment relationship. They did not
question the inviolability of property rights or the right of owners and their
stewards, management, to exercise sole control over the affairs of the busi-
ness.23 ° But for the welfare capitalists, legitimizing the corporation meant
that property rights needed to be exercised with reference to the obligations
that the corporation as a member of society owed to the broader society.
These obligations included at least partial responsibility for the well-being
of workers.2 3 t
Paul W. Litchfield of Goodyear Tire and Rubber articulated perhaps
the most intellectually coherent statement of welfare capitalism's resolution
of the tensions between property rights and the values of the polity.
232
Litchfield distinguished between human rights-possessed by each member
of the company, which the company had no right to abridge-and property
rights, enjoyed only by owners.233 For Litchfield, the function of employee
representation was to protect workers' rights to fair wages and fair, safe
working conditions.234 Decision-making authority, however, derived from
property rights and was properly exercised only by owners or by manage-
ment as the owners' representatives. In Litchfield's view, until labor risked
its financial capital in the business enterprise, it had no legitimate claim to
the exercise of property rights.235
227. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
228. See MITCHELL, supra note 220, at 110-11.
229. See id.
230. See P.W. LITCHFIELD, THE INDUSTRIAL REPUBLIC: REFLECTIONS OF AN INDUSTRIAL LIEUTEN-
ANT 24-26 (1946).
231. See BRODY, supra note 37, at 52 (noting that Elbert Gary, no friend of the labor movement,
saw welfare work as a duty capital owed to labor). See also MITCHELL, supra note 220, at 119 (discuss-
ing growing concern for workers' well-being on the part of businessmen during the twenties).
232. See LrrCHFMELD, supra note 230, at 41-73.
233. See id. at 24-29.
234. See generally id. at 29 (arguing that workers should be involved in decision-making if they
make financial contributions to the company).
235. See id. at 24-25.
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Even if labor and management had different rights and played different
roles, these differences did not, according to the welfare capitalist view,
necessarily mean that the two groups were inevitably locked into conflict.
For welfare capitalists like A. Lincoln Filene, John D. Rockefeller, and
Litchfield, labor-management conflict was the result of misunderstandings
236that arose in large part from the increased size of companies. It was
these misunderstandings, not any inherent conflict of interest, that led to
industrial unrest.237 Properly conceived, welfare programs, and in particu-
lar employee representation programs, could eliminate these misunder-
standings and create a harmonious corporation in which labor and
management both worked in a principled manner for the common good.
For the welfare capitalists, one of the main difficulties with unionism
was that outside unions had little direct knowledge of conditions within
individual companies and thus were not appropriately sympathetic to the
constraints and risks that employers faced in running their businesses.238
Moreover, the adversarial approach of outside unions rendered peaceful dis-
cussion and cooperation impossible.239 Finally, within the welfare capital-
ist's view, the average worker was not an adversary, but a potential junior
partner who desired not to control the business but simply to be treated
justly and fairly.24° Unions, therefore, were undesirable because they
sought to limit management's exercise of its prerogatives and, in so doing,
upset the natural balance between workers and management within the en-
lightened welfare capitalist firm.24 '
2. The Welfare Capitalist Conception of Industrial Democracy
Employee stock ownership and employee representation were the pil-
lars of the welfare capitalist conception of industrial democracy. Stock
ownership offered employees access to property rights.242 Employee repre-
236. See, e.g., id. at 46 (noting that "[t]he heads of the company knew all of the employees person-
ally in the early days," but that by 1919, when Goodyear's supervisory forces alone consisted of 863
men, this personal connection no longer existed).
237. See, e.g., BERNSrTEn, supra note 222, at 164-65 (discussing Rockefeller's views on the causes
of industrial unrest).
238. See BRANDES, supra note 218, at 121.
239. See DANIEL BLOOMFIELD, PROBLEMS IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 482, 488-89 (1923).
240. See, e.g., FLENE, supra note 222, at 67 (arguing the "[t]he average employee cares nothing for
owning an industry. Its perplexities and losses are not for him."); id. at 150-52 (discussing an employee
survey finding that an overwhelming number of employees did not want a voice in management). See
also JOHN CALDER, CAPrrAL's DuTY TO THE WAGE-EARNER 228 (1923).
241. Anti-unionism did not necessarily preclude support for greater democratization of the work-
place, nor did anti-unionism preclude concern on the part of welfare capitalists for improving employ-
ees' standard of living. See generally BERNSTUN, supra note 222, at 159-62. Instead, anti-unionism
was a component of a philosophy of industrial relations premised on the voluntary subordination of
property rights to larger societal goals. Any attempt to coerce such restraint was tantamount to "confis-
cation and injustice." See LITCHFIELD, supra note 230, at 26.
242. A Proposal by the Stockholders of the Larkin Co. to Its Employees (1919), in DARwN D.
MARTIN PAPERS 1 (Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society MS-B76-1, Box 1 Folder 7).
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sentation, on the other hand, offered workers immediate input into the day
to day functioning of the company, thereby giving employees access to
human rights.
a. Employee Stock Ownership Plans
The number of companies offering stock ownership plans increased
dramatically during the early and mid 1920s. 43 But despite the idealistic
rhetoric of the welfare capitalists,244 stock ownership plans were designed
in ways that rendered illusory any prospect of significant worker control. In
some companies, employees could not sell their shares except to the com-
pany. 45 Companies established rigid eligibility requirements, often requir-
ing employees to serve for a number of years before they became eligible to
buy stock.246 Given high annual turnover rates, these requirements made it
virtually certain that relatively few employees would ever become share-
holders. The cost of shares was often too high for workers in the lower
wage brackets; 47 the majority of stock purchases were made by high salary
employees, not ordinary workers.2 48 In practice, these restrictions meant
that employees as a whole exercised no real control of the company.
24 9
Accordingly, it is not surprising that employees did not respond as enthusi-
astically to the stock plans of the 1920s as employers had hoped.25°
b. Employee Representation
In 1898, the Filene department store became the first important Ameri-
can company to institute an employee representation plan.2 1  Not until
1915 did larger companies, like Colorado Fuel and Iron, begin to introduce
243. See BRANDEs, supra note 218, at 83-84 (discussing the growth of employee stock ownership
plans).
244. See, e.g., A Plan for Industrial Partnership (undated), DARWIN D. MARTIN PAPERS, supra note
242, at 2 (2-MS- B76-1, Box 1, Folder 8) (contending that "[d]irect co-partnership management," of
which employee stock ownership was a variety, "is a form of socialism of the highest, best and most
ideal sort, a socialism that makes real partners of employer and employee and yet preserves a right of
private property and individual initiative, giving the worker new inspiration for effort, and humanizing
all").
245. A Plan for Co-Operative Ownership (1919), DARWIN D. MARTIN PAPERS, supra note 242, at 5
(Buffalo & Erie County Historical Society MS-B76-1, Box 1, Folder 8).
246. See, e.g., id. (in order to be a charter employee stockholder, employees must have been em-
ployed for three full years as of January 1, 1919, and in addition, have been at least twenty-one years of
age and a citizen of the United States).
247. See BRANDES, supra note 218, at 90.
248. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 222, at 183.
249. See, e.g., RAY STANNARD BAKER, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL UNREST: REASONS AND REMEDES
139-40 (1920) (Although 61,000 of U.S. Steel's 268,000 employees owned stock in 1919, their stock
amounted to only one fifty-fourth of the company's total shares.).
250. An employee of U.S. Steel argued that "every share has a string attached"-"[s]tock owner-
ship" could also become "a long chain shackling the employee to the company." Id. at 141. But
employees also used stock purchase plans to their own advantage and recognized that the stock market
could be volatile. See COHEN, supra note 219, at 195.
251. See BRANDs, supra note 218, at 121-22.
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their employee representation plans.252 During World War I, the federal
government supported the creation of company unions as a means of set-
tling labor disputes which could threaten wartime production.253 The popu-
larity of employee representation increased throughout the twenties: in
1922, 690,000 workers were represented by employee representation plans;
by 1928, the number had risen to over 1,500,000.254 As with modem El
programs, the popularity of employee representation increased at a time
when union density was decreasing.255 Along with other aspects of welfare
capitalism, companies employing more than 5,000 workers sponsored the
majority of employee representation plans.25 6
Although fear of labor unrest played a role in the introduction of many
of employee representation plans 2 5 ' anti-unionism alone does not explain
fully the reasons for the post-war growth of employee representation plans.
Employee representation was introduced during the war because it was use-
ful in promoting worker-management cooperation.258 But the force of war-
time rhetoric also convinced some businessmen to import democratic
institutions and rhetoric into the workplace, as employers also realized that
employee representation could act as a means to harmonize political and
workplace cultures.259
Many employee representation plans equated industrial democracy
with the creation of employee representation committees which superfi-
cially resembled American political and legal institutions. A number of
employee representation plans were modeled on the structure of the na-
tional government and operated under the terms of management-written
constitutions.26 ° In some cases these constitutions granted workers limited
due process protections. 261 While nearly all of the plans adopted demo-
252. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 222, at 160.
253. See SQUIRE, supra note 29, at 142.
254. See CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANY UNIONS, supra note 64, at 24-25.
255. Union membership dropped from 19.4 percent of the nonagricultural workforce in 1920 to
10.2 percent in 1930. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 222, at 84. The two developments are not necessarily
causally related. As with contemporary El, employee representation plans might have filled a vacuum
created by the decline of union strength.
256. In 1928, over 63 percent of employee representation plans existed in companies employing
more than 15,000 workers. See id. at 171.
257. During WWI, the United States government mandated the introduction of employee represen-
tation plans where unions did not exist in order to ward off labor unrest. See DtNLOP COMM'N FACr-
FINDING REP., supra note 2, at 46. Although many of these plans went out of existence at the end of the
war, the labor unrest of 1919 was a catalyst for some employers' introduction of employee representa-
tion plans. See, e.g., OzANNE, supra note 216, at 116-17.
258. See CHAAScrEsTIcs OF COMPANY UNIONS, supra note 64, at 19.
259. Litchfield, at least, felt compelled by the force of wartime rhetoric to attempt to realize demo-
cratic ideals in the workplace. See, e.g., LrrcHFMLD, supra note 230, at 43-45. Brody argues that
industrial democracy became "a national by-word during World War I." BRODY, supra note 37, at 56.
The idea, he contends, had powerful idealistic appeal through the 1920's. See id.
260. See BP ANDSES, supra note 218, at 122-23 (discussing characteristics of the Leitch Plans).
261. See, e.g., FN-E, supra note 222, at 59-60, 93-110 (reproducing the constitution of the Filene
Cooperative Association); LrrcwMnL, supra note 230, at 50-60 (reproducing the constitution of the
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cratic procedural devices, the decision-making authority of employee repre-
sentatives was limited.262 Employers generally listened to individual but
not group grievances.26 3 Employee representation plans permitted employ-
ees to challenge the ways in which policies were administered, but not the
policies themselves. 264 Employee representatives had little power to com-
pel management to grant wage increases. 265 Employee representation com-
mittees had no power to strike, no strike funds, and no access to information
about conditions in other plants.266 The decisions of many employee repre-
sentation groups could also be overruled by management.267 In sum, em-
ployee representation organizations had no ability to engage in meaningful
discussion of wages or conditions of work.
268
It appears that workers recognized that the employee representation
plans offered them no real power to affect the conditions of their employ-
ment. The high levels of employee apathy which so perplexed management
indicate that employees "saw through" the representation programs and ex-
pected almost nothing from them.269  Nonetheless, the evidence suggests
that employee representation groups were not entirely powerless; they man-
aged to exercise some influence over company policy, primarily by creating
seniority systems, coordinating relief work during economic downturns,
and administering company welfare programs.27°
On the whole, it appears that employee representation achieved, at
best, a very limited democratization of the workplace. As long as manage-
ment retained control over the ability to create, modify, and terminate pro-
grams not required by law,27 1 the only constraints on welfare capitalists
Goodyear Industrial Assembly); CALDER, supra note 240, at 293-318 (reproducing the constitution of
the Swift Company's employee representation plan).
262. For example, Goodyear employees could formulate and pass legislation dealing with any area
of plant life. See LrcTHFELD, supra note 230, at 29. Next, legislation went to the Cabinet which had
absolute veto power over any measure that dealt with economic rights. A cabinet veto on matters of
human rights could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both legislative houses. For veto and override
procedures, see id. at 29, 53-54.
263. See CoNrs, supra note 219, at 173.
264. See id.
265. See BERNSrEN, supra note 222, at 173.
266. See id. See also Ozanne, supra note 216, at 123 (arguing that the employee representation plan
of International Harvester "effectively isolated Harvester employees by plant").
267. See OzNrN, supra note 216, at 122 (management held veto power over Harvester Works
Councils' actions); BRANDES, supra note 218, at 122. But see FrLEsE, supra note 222, at 58 (employee
representative decisions could not be vetoed by management).
268. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 222, at 173 (noting that company unions were ineffective with
respect to wages, hours, and the handling of grievances).
269. Workers at Bethlehem Steel, Colorado Fuel and Iron and Proctor & Gamble were not enthusi-
astic about employee representation. See BRANDES, supra note 218, at 129. An observer at a Proctor &
Gamble Works Council meeting remarked that nothing of importance was discussed. See BRODY, supra
note 37, at 60.
270. Daniel Nelson, The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination, 56 Bus. HIST.
REV. 335, 350, 355 (1982).
271. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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were those imposed by their own rhetoric272 or the market. As a result,
even though welfare capitalism may have provided workers with rudimen-
tary access to rights of representation, participation, due process, dissent,
and personal dignity,273 without the independent power to negotiate and
bargain with employers, those rights existed at the whim of management.
And because welfare capitalists could not conceive of an industrial relations
system not based upon the voluntary restraint of inviolable rights to control
property, neither could they grasp the fundamental contradiction at the heart
of the system; a contradiction embodied in Filene's statement: "[s]uch is the
constitution adopted under the bill of rights we gave our people, by our own
desire and not at their demand." '7 4
B. Contemporary E1 Programs
For some commentators there is little danger that modem El programs
will function like the employee representation plans of the 1920s and
1930s. The workforce, they argue, is more educated and hence less likely
to be coerced by management into foregoing independent representation.275
Empirical studies and anecdotal information suggest that El programs
do provide greater opportunities for employees to participate in discussion
of work-related matters and that these discussions enhance job satisfaction,
at least in the short run. Many employees also believe they have benefitted
personally from their involvement in El programs.276 These benefits in-
clude a heightened sense of personal efficacy resulting from participation in
the decision-making process, improved working conditions, and better em-
ployee-supervisor relations.277 Finally, employees report feeling more pos-
itive about their work when they know that they have a direct influence
over the work environment and can communicate with others at the work-
place without relying on intermediaries. 278 Thus, Graham and Verma con-
clude that there is "general agreement that El programs enhance the
272. See Virk, supra note 26, at 729, 754.
273. See DERBER, supra note 39, at 100.
274. FmFEN, supra note 222, at 110.
275. See, e.g., Hearing: TEAM Act of 1997, supra note 111, at 82 (statement of Prof. Estreicher).
276. See Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note 6, at 31 (state-
ment of Mr. Knicely) (referring to Princeton Research Associates' study in which 79% of nonmanager-
ial non-union participants in El programs reported having "personally benefitted from [their]
involvement in the program by getting more influence [in] how [their] job is done").
277. See e.g., Hearing: Legal Problems with Employee Involvement Programs, supra note 20, at 8-
10 (testimony of Molly Dalman, employee, Donnelly Corp.) (discussing the positive effects of her in-
volvement in workplace teams); Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note
6, at 61 (testimony of Elaine Jensen, employee, FMC Corp.) ("We trust that management and that our
contracts manager will bring in business for us.").
278. See Hearing: H.R. 743, supra note 9, at 19 (testimony of Julie Smith, Team Advisor, TRW
Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc.).
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affective response to work."'279 In this respect, the positive employee re-
sponses to modem E1 programs would appear to contrast sharply with the
apathetic responses of employees in the 1920s to welfare capitalism. But,
Graham and Verma note that such self-reported results of El programs may
be misleading.28 ° Specifically, employees who are the most favorably dis-
posed to El programs may participate in these programs more frequently
than employees who are less enthusiastic about El.281 In fact, one commen-
tator believes that given selection bias, the lack of clear evidence linking El
to improved affective responses to work is both "striking and damning. 282
In addition, some studies have found disparities between worker and man-
agement responses to El, with workers responding much more negatively
than management. 283 Thus, further research is clearly needed to determine
whether positive affective responses are the result of self-selection or other
employee personality variables, and not of the nature of El programs
themselves.284
Commentators have also argued that there is little evidence that coop-
erative programs represent a move away from authoritarian workplaces, and
toward industrial democracy.285 One commentator has argued that manage-
ment carefully controls El programs "to prevent workers from expanding
the scope of their participation" and that, as a result, the promise of in-
creased worker influence and power is largely illusory.286 Studies have
found that El programs undermine employee solidarity and turn workers
against one another in part because these programs convey a message that
workers need to measure their productivity against that of their peers.287 In
addition, individuals with unpopular viewpoints may be subjected to subtle
psychological pressure to conform to the views of an El group and may be
labeled "poor team players" or "losers" by fellow workers or management
279. Jill W. Graham & Anil Verma, Predictors and Moderators of Employee Responses to Em-
ployee Participation Programs, 44 HuM. REL. 551, 552 (1991).
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management and the Theory of the Firm, 21 J.
Co"w. L. 651, 678 (1995). But see Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking the Paradigm: Can the Wagner Act
and Labor-Management Cooperation Coexist, 8 DEPAu.L Bus. L.J. 159, 173 (1996) (arguing that studies
have demonstrated a positive relationship between employee involvement and firm performance).
283. See, e.g., Tom Juravich et al., Mutual Gains? Labor and Management Evaluate Their Em-
ployee Involvement Programs, 14 J. OF LAB. REs. 165, 181 (1993) (noting that what is striking in their
survey of labor and management perceptions of El in a unionized facility is that "management and labor
have completely different views on the impact of their El program on workers' morale, supervisory
relations, productivity and quality with no correlation between labor and management responses").
284. See Graham & Verma, supra note 279, at 552.
285. Steven H. London, The New Industrial Relations Ideology and the Decline of Labor, 18 PoL-
icy SruoD. J. 481, 489 (1989-90).
286. See, e.g., Rick Fantasia et al., A Critical View of Worker Participation in American Industry,
15 WORK & Occul'A-ons 468, 471 (1988).
287. See id. at 476.
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if they do not.2 88 In these respects, peer pressure functions not only as a
form of social control but as a form of indirect management control as
well.289 The personal nature of worker-management contact in El programs
can also function as a form of social control of employees. Specifically, by
personalizing bureaucracy and humanizing power without changing the un-
derlying authoritarian structure of the workplace,29 ° employees who deviate
from managerial expectations may feel that they have violated a personal
rather than the more impersonal and often adversarial employment
relationship.
In his study of management use of quality circles during a union or-
ganizing drive at the Ethicon Company plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
Grenier demonstrated some of the ways in which El programs can function
as an extremely effective means for management to circumvent captive au-
dience rules and other NLRB rules designed to protect employees from
management coercion.29 ' The quality circles existed before the union drive
and were not established to thwart union organizing. But during the or-
ganizing drive, management used the quality circles as a conduit to pass
anti-union information to employees. 292 The company also used the quality
circles to identify potential union organizers and threatened pro-union qual-
ity circle members with dismissal if they joined the union. 93 Grenier ar-
gues that through these practices, the company used the rhetoric of popular
psychology and personalism to increase its control over employees.2 94
Although the union filed a number of unfair labor practice charges, com-
pany management was willing to risk litigation and trust that their methods
of "psychological persuasion" within the quality circles would result in em-
ployees repudiating the union.295
Grenier's criticisms of the quality circles are reminiscent of those lev-
eled against employee representation plans of the 1920s and 1930s. But
while it is true that El programs may cloak the reality of continued em-
ployer control in the empowerment language of popular psychology, surely
288. See GUILLERMO GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUALrrY CIRCLES & ANTI-UNIONISM IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 16, 192 (1992).
289. See id. at 16.
290. See id. at 17, 18.
291. See id. at 106-15.
292. See id. at 109. Employees were told that they would lose their autonomy and that the union
would make decisions for them. See id. at 82. Grenier also notes that quality circle facilitators were
trained by the company to identify and influence pro-union employees. See id. at 68.
293. See id. at 113. Pro-union employees were pulled from their machines and interrogated about
their union activities in plain view of their co-workers. The company's social psychologist attempted to
"counsel" employees out of their pro-union sympathies by treating pro-union employees as though they
had temporarily "succumbed to an attitudinal sickness." Pro-union employees, therefore, needed treat-
ment. See id. at 124. The company lumped personal problems, lack of productivity, and pro-union
sympathies under the rubric of counter-productive behavior. See id. at 75.
294. See id. at 18, 131.
295. See id. at 83, 87, 118.
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the employees of the 1990s are capable of appreciating that El programs do
not necessarily create a true partnership between labor and management.
Indeed, Grenier's study indicates that employees understood fully both how
the company used the quality circles and the amount of power management
actually exercised them.396
Ironically, the evidence suggests that cooperative programs in non-
union workplaces do not necessarily lead to greater productivity. Despite
the contentions of some commentators for whom the adversarial and coop-
erative models of labor relations are incompatible, several recent studies
suggest that El programs in unionized firms tend to be at least as successful,
if not more successful than Els in non-union firms. In a recent study of two
large manufacturing firms, only one of which was unionized, El programs
administered jointly by unions and management achieved productivity
gains equivalent to those achieved in non-union settings.29 7 Another study
of one thousand unionized and non-unionized plants found that El programs
were one-third more effective when a union was present.298 Several other
studies have found that in unionized settings the survival of El programs is
significantly increased if union and management are partners in El group
efforts.2 99 Plants with unions but no El programs were found to be nearly
twice as productive as plants with EI's and no unions.3" According to the
Dunlop Commission, joint union-management partnership significantly im-
proved a given El program's survival.3" 1 For Graham and Verma, the out-
comes of El programs are also better when unions are involved.3 °2 Union
representation may, therefore, provide employees with the security and the
voice to engage in the "contentious give and take"' 30 3 discussions sometimes
necessary to realize El's goals of utilizing fully the intellectual resources of
employees.3°
296. See id. at 91.
297. William Cooke, Product Quality Improvement Through Employee Participation: The Effects
of Unionization and Joint Union/Management Administration, 46 INDus. & LAB. Rm. REv. 119, 132
(1992).
298. See Metzgar, supra note 116, at 71.
299. See DuNLoP COMM'N FAcT-FiNDING REP'., supra note 2, at 35.
300. See Metzgar, supra note 116, at 71.
301. See DuNLoP COMM'N FAcT-FIND NG REP., supra note 2, at 35.
302. See Graham & Verma, supra note 279, at 552.
303. See Metzgar, supra note 116, at 71. See also Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions
and Contemporary Innovation in Work Organization and Employee Participation, in UNIONS & Eco-
NOMIC COMPETrrVENESS 194-96 (Laurence Nischel & Paula B. Voos, eds. 1992) (arguing that unions
offer workers who speak their minds freedom from reprisals for speaking out). Because unions can say
no, they can also say yes to such efforts. See id. at 198.
304. See, e.g., Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note 6, at 30
(statement of Mr. Knicely) (arguing that pre-EI methods of human resource management "underutilized
a tremendously valuable asset - the intellectual resources of our work force").
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C. Welfare Capitalism and Modem El Programs
Clearly, there are important differences between welfare capitalism
and modem El programs. However, these differences should not obscure
the very real similarities between the two systems. Welfare capitalism and
El were both begun at times when the corporate form was being questioned,
either because of its failure to create a peaceful industrial order, in the case
of welfare capitalism, or because of its failure to compete effectively in a
global market, in the case of El. Both systems gained popularity as worker
alienation, whether expressed in the form of labor militancy, high turnover,
or pervasive worker apathy, threatened productivity. Each system devel-
oped techniques to respond to pragmatic business considerations. But in
both, pragmatic responses were outgrowths of a broader philosophy of in-
dustrial relations designed to restructure all workplace interactions to con-
form with management's objectives and its assumptions about the mutuality
of employer and employee interests.
Central to that philosophy is the notion of voluntary management re-
straint. Restraint is often synonymous with magnanimity, reasonableness,
and consideration. Nonetheless, behavior displaying these qualities implic-
itly underscores management's superior power in the employment relation-
ship and suggests alternative ways in which that power can be exercised.
Furthermore, as with welfare capitalism, EI's promise of increased worker
participation is supported by nothing stronger than mutual trust.
Differences between welfare capitalism and El are more reflective of
changing fashions in rhetoric than they are of substantive differences be-
tween the two systems. Both welfare capitalism and El view unions as
destructive influences in the workplace. But whereas welfare capitalists
were unabashedly anti-union and introduced welfare programs for the ex-
press purpose of making unions less attractive to workers, modem practi-
tioners of EI are less likely to articulate anti-union sentiments openly.
Nonetheless, terms like "adversarial," "bureaucratic," and "rigid," when
used in reference to labor relations practices in older-and implicitly union-
ized-manufacturing industries, have definitively pejorative connotations,
particularly when juxtaposed against the El ideals of an open, flexible, in-
formal, cooperative workplace.3 °5 Second, both welfare capitalism and El
programs use highly positive, emotionally-charged language to present pro-
grams to workers. The evidence suggests that employees in the twenties
were keenly aware that welfare capitalist programs were not in fact capable
of or concerned with developing the "human factor" or the "right relations
in industry." Interestingly, however, the emphasis on reconciling the social
relations of the workplace and the polity central to welfare capitalism is
entirely absent from the rhetoric of modem El. Instead, El replaces the
305. See Hearing: H.R. 743, supra note 9, at 7, 8, 14 (statement of Mr. Morley).
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language of industrial democracy with the language of empowerment, ful-
fillment and self-realization imported from popular psychology, motivation
seminars, and talk shows.
By holding out to employees the opportunity to fulfill through work
personal goals much sought after in other realms of life, El programs may
have a significant initial emotional appeal, but in reality do little to change
the hierarchical, authoritarian nature of the traditional workplace.
For instance, one commentator views El as simply an adaptive re-
sponse to inefficiencies created by the excessive bureaucracy and hierarchy
that are characteristic of large corporations. Within this view, El functions
as a means of bypassing hierarchy without overthrowing it.3" 6 Specifically,
large firms create bureaucracies to make the flow of information more effi-
cient, but excess layers are also created when managers engage in empire
building.3"7 These unnecessary layers distort the flow of information and
lengthen the path it must travel to reach decision-makers.3 °8 In addition,
there also exist "information asymmetries," which, in spite of Taylorism,
result in workers having more actual knowledge about production processes
than those higher up in the workplace hierarchy.30 9 El solves these
problems in two ways. First, El enables management to bypass hierarchy
and "tap workers' knowledge directly. '' 310 Second, El also plays a monitor-
ing function by using peer pressure as a means of preventing employees
from shirking. 311 In El, therefore, groups become a self-monitoring device,
and El builds on values that "American workers deem important like self-
respect via doing a good job and earning the respect of one's peers.
312
Thus, El fulfills managerial objectives, but not necessarily the goals of pro-
moting either industrial democracy or employee empowerment.
In sum, in management-initiated cooperative models whether in the
form of welfare capitalism or EI, management strictly demarcates permissi-
ble levels of worker participation. Employees are given a measure of con-
trol over some job tasks or aspects of the work environment, while
management remains in full control of the overall enterprise. Patterns of
ownership do not change, management can stop experiments with job-rede-
sign or self-managed work teams at any time, and the reward structures and
evaluation procedures within the firm remain entirely in management's
hands.313
306. See Bainbridge, supra note 282, at 696.
307. See id. at 680.
308. See id. at 681.
309. See id. at 682.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 690.
312. See id. at 692.
313. See Rothschild-Whitt & Lindenfeld, supra note 28, at 5.
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The cooperative model thus stands in sharp contrast to the collective
bargaining model. Although the collective bargaining model also accepts
management control over key decisions regarding the deployment of re-
sources, unlike the cooperative model, collective bargaining creates bind-
ing, enforceable limits on the exercise of managerial power.3 14
Consequently, collective bargaining can provide workers with the power to
affect the terms and conditions of their employment; El programs cannot.
In these respects, the collective bargaining appears to be more effective than
the cooperative model in achieving democratization of the workplace.
Nonetheless, El programs do give employees opportunities to partici-
pate in some types of workplace decision-making. EI's repudiation of
Taylorism promises to give employees increased input into problem-solv-
ing. El also has the potential to break down rigid and artificial distinctions
between jobs. Empirical evidence suggests that in these respects, El re-
sponds more effectively than traditional unions to the desires of the contem-
porary workforce.3t 5 The work force is more educated and, studies suggest,
more interested in having direct input into enterprise planning and cul-
ture.316 Historically, unions have focused on issues like wages, seniority,
and pensions, but not on issues involving the deployment or the mobility of
capital or the organization of work routines. As a result, traditional unions
may not offer the kinds of representation employees appear to want. It
should be noted, however, that the focus of contemporary unions on "bread
and butter" issues derives in large measure from limitations the courts have
placed on the topics over which unions and management may bargain.3 17
Current labor law, therefore, leaves unions and employers alike in a
paradoxical situation. Absent management agreement, unions may not bar-
gain over the issues which appear to interest workers most. Conversely, El
programs offer employees at least the appearance of input into the decision-
making process, but many El programs are illegal under current law. Thus,
314. See Virk, supra note 26, at 755-56.
315. See, e.g., Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note 6, at 14
(statement of Rep. Steve Gunderson) (noting that a Princeton Research Associates' survey found that by
a 2 to 1 margin, employees preferred joint worker-management committees over unions or union-like
organizations).
316. See Hyde, supra note 15, at 151 (noting that professional, white collar, and managerial em-
ployees want more than bread and butter unionism; instead, professionals want help with career plan-
ning and input into enterprise planning and culture). Squire notes that the number of white collar
workers now exceeds the number of blue collar workers and that workers are better educated. As levels
of education increase, so too, Squire argues, do workers' expectations and desires "to exercise responsi-
bility, self-direction, and skill in work life." Squire, supra note 29, at 171. Squire concludes that contem-
porary employees are more individualistic than workers in the 1940's or 1950's and that they place
greater importance on realizing self-esteem and self-actualization through work. These needs, Squire
argues, are not adequately addressed by traditional union organizing and collective bargaining agree-
ments. In addition, Squire contends, organized labor has displayed "no sense of urgency in developing a
strategic plan aimed specifically at organizing white collar workers." Squire, supra note 29, at 171-75.
317. See infra Part IV.2.a. for a discussion of mandatory/permissive jurisprudence and the effect of
the distinction on limiting subjects over which employees and managers can bargain.
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under current labor law and in the absence of the TEAM Act, employees
may not be able to engage in discussion of those areas of workplace life
which concern them most. 318 Accordingly, despite the potential of El pro-
grams to function in authoritarian ways, perhaps Sections 2(5) and/or
8(a)(2) of the NLRA should be changed to enable a wider range of El pro-
grams to flourish. In fact, the need for legal change appears to be particu-
larly great where, as is the case today, less than fifteen percent of the
workforce is represented at all.319 However, from the standpoint of indus-
trial democracy, any attempt to modify Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) to accom-
modate management-initiated El programs in non-union workplaces must
do two things. First, they must create a legal framework capable of nurtur-
ing the potential of El programs to involve employees in workplace govern-
ance. Second, such attempts must also erect safeguards against the
potential of El programs to reduce employee freedom of expression .320 As
the next section will demonstrate, the TEAM Act does neither.
IV.
THE TEAM ACT
The Findings and Purposes section of the TEAM Act recapitulates the
arguments of El supporters. Global competition has required employers to
make dramatic changes in workplace relationships.3 2  These changes, re-
ferred to collectively as employee involvement, provide employees with an
enhanced role in workplace decision-making.322 Not only has El enhanced
productivity and efficiency, it has had a "positive impact on the lives of
such employees, better enabling them to reach their potential in the
workforce. 32 3  But legitimate employee involvement programs are
threatened by the NLRA's prohibition against company unions,3 24 even
though legitimate El programs do not attempt to interfere with collective
bargaining rights and bear little resemblance to the sham company unions
of the 1930's. 325 The TEAM Act, therefore, is designed to protect legiti-
mate El programs in non-union settings, including those in which workers
may discuss the terms and conditions of employment, and to encourage
their continued evolution and proliferation.32 6
318. See, e.g., Rominger, supra note 282, at 186
319. For a discussion of declining union density, see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
320. See Virk, supra note 26, at 754. This is particularly important in employment at will contexts
in which employers need not justify their reasons for acting.
321. See TEAM Act, supra note 16, § 2(a)(1).
322. See id. §§ 2(a)(1), (2).
323. See id. § 2(a)(4).
324. See id. § 2(a)(7).
325. See id. § 2(a)(6).
326. See id. § 2(b)(1)-(3). See also Employee Involvement: House Panel Approves TEAM Act,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at d-3 (June 23, 1995) (restricting El activities in union settings).
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The Act inserts, at the end of the current Section 8(a)(2), language
permitting an employer to "establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any
organization or entity of any kind... to address matters of mutual interest,
including but not limited to, issues of quality, productivity, efficiency,
safety and health . -.2' The Act's definition of matters of mutual interest
is open-ended and places no limitations on the subjects that may be ad-
dressed by employers and employees in El programs. When read in con-
junction with Section 2(b)(3) of the Act's statement of Findings and
Purpose, collective bargaining topics could be matters of mutual interest
and, consequently, permissible topics of discussion in El programs.328 The
Act does not impair the right of employees to organize or to join labor
organizations, nor does it eliminate employers' obligation to bargain with
labor organizations representing employees.329 It also mandates that em-
ployees and managers participate in El programs on an equal basis, insofar
as equal participation is "practicable."33
A. Arguments of Supporters and Opponents
Debate over the TEAM Act has broken down along party lines.
Republicans supported by the National Chamber of Commerce, a group of
employers calling itself the TEAM Coalition, and the heads of a number of
the nation's largest companies, including IBM, Kodak, and Motorola, favor
passage of the Act. Democrats, supported by the AFL-CIO and a number
of labor law scholars, generally oppose it.
33 1
327. TEAM Act, supra note 16, § 3. The TEAM Act would amend § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA by
striking the semicolon at the end of the section and adding § 3 of the TEAM Act. Thus, § 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA as amended by the TEAM Act would read as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate cr interfere with the formation
or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Pro-
vided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to § 6
[Section 156 of this title], an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to
confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay. Provided further, that it
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an
employer to establish, assist, maintain or participate in any organization or entity of any kind,
in which employees who participate at least to the same extent practicable as representatives
of management participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to,
issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have,
claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to
negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements with the employer and any labor
organization, except that in a case in which a labor organization is the representative of such
employees as provided in Section 9(a), this proviso shall not apply.
(TEAM amendment in italics).
328. The TEAM Act, supra note 16, § 2(b)(3), reads as follows: "The purpose of this Act is "(3) to
allow legitimate Employee Involvement programs, in which workers may discuss issues involving terms
and conditions of employment, to continue to evolve and proliferate."
329. See id. § 3.
330. See id.
331. See Employee Participation: Business Leaders Urge Clinton to Sign Teamwork Legislation,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at d-6 (June 25, 1996).
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Supporters argue that labor-management relations have changed fun-
damentally in the years since the passage of the NLRA.332 No longer are
employees and employers adversaries.33 3 Instead, both recognize their com-
mon interest in ensuring the continued viability and competitiveness of
American industry in the global market.33 4 In addition, supporters contend
that El programs differ fundamentally from the company unions of the
1930s and present none of their dangers.335 Moreover, the small size of El
programs encourages employees to be more assertive than they might be in
large organizations.336 These characteristics of El programs, when coupled
with a finding that employees volunteered to participate in El groups at
least as frequently as management selected representatives, suggest that
"more employers are pushing power down to the 'shop floor.' ' 3 3 7 Because
the dangers Section 8(a)(2) addressed no longer exist, it is unnecessary to
maintain the wall of silence Section 8(a)(2) erects between labor and man-
agement in unorganized workplaces.
Even if El programs share some of the characteristics of company un-
ions, supporters argue, the critical difference between the two is that unlike
company unions, legitimate El programs do not attempt to represent em-
ployees. 338 Furthermore, under current law, employers may dictate to non-
unionized employees on any issue involving the conditions of work.3 39 In
the cooperative model, management's exercise of authority is limited by the
332. See, e.g., Hearing: Legal Problems with Employee Involvement Programs, supra note 20, at
72 (statement of David E. Khorey, Attorney, Labor Law specialist).
333. See 141 CONG. REc. E228 (daily ed. January 31, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fawell) ("American
business is no longer faced with the type of labor-management strife that permeated virtually every
aspect of industrial America during the 1930's. Instead, we are witness to [sic] growing trend in which
American workers and managers are abandoning the confrontational tactics of their past and, together,
are seeking better ways of doing business."); 142 CONG. REc. S7478 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Gorton) ("This is 1996 .... We have a far more cooperative attitude today .... We do not need
to repeat the arguments of 1935. They are no longer relevant.").
334. See 141 CONG. REc. H9525 (daily ed. Sept 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fawell) ("They are
teams of employees who, under an infinite number of methods, are freely experimenting, usually quite
informally and successfully with new and exciting ways of pursuing quality and greater productivity,
and satisfaction at the place of employment. They were unimagined in the thirties."); 142 CONG. REC.
S7480 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("On this one, I am strongly in favor of doing
what must be done to improve this Nation's productivity, and that is what we are talking about here -
this Nation's productivity - for if there is no productivity, there is no profit. If there is no profit, there
is nothing for the workers and the management to split up for the owners and the stockholders.").
335. See LeRoy, supra note 17, at 218.
336. See id. at 253-54.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 104-248, supra note 17, at 18; S. REP. 105-12. supra note 18, at 23; 142
CONG. REc. S7470 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum) (The TEAM Act is not "an
effort to have a sham type of union." Instead, "[o]nce workers seek the union the employer must recog-
nize the union as the employee representative.").
339. See Hearing: TEAM Act of 1997, supra note 111, at 8 (statement of William D. Bundinger,
Chairman & C.E.O., Rodel, Inc.).
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concept of cooperation itself.3 4 ° Thus, employees benefit from El in that
they achieve real decision-making authority, not guaranteed to them by law.
The TEAM Act not only preserves employees' right to choose to be
represented by independent labor organizations, but supporters argue, EI
offers employees more opportunities for participation than exist with repre-
sentation by a traditional union. This is because El topics like product de-
sign or quality fall outside the scope of topics over which unions can
bargain.34 ' Finally, supporters note the irony inherent in a labor law pur-
portedly designed to enhance the exercise of employee choice but which
forecloses the possibility that employees might voluntarily choose to have
their interests represented by an EI team.342
Opponents of the TEAM Act argue that it is not a panacea for in-
creased productivity or labor-management peace, but rather an attempt to
weaken organized labor and the NLRA's collective bargaining protec-
tions.34 3 Legitimate employee involvement programs, they argue, are al-
ready protected under existing law. 3" The management-initiated programs
the TEAM Act would legalize are illegitimate because they offer employees
only the illusion of empowerment. Under the Act, employers would have
complete authority to determine the structure and function of El programs,
to hand-pick team members, to set the team agenda, and to dissolve these
340. Cf. id. at 9 ("If my company adopted an abusive management style, our employees would
begin to focus their attention on protecting themselves instead of producing top quality products.").
341. Some supporters argue that unions themselves are becoming anachronisms because of civil
rights laws which limit employers' ability to discriminate in hiring, firing, and benefit practices. See
Rominger, supra note 282, at 180. Because these civil rights laws allow employees to directly enforce
their rights, supporters explain, they do not have as great a need for unions to contract for or to enforce
their rights in the workplace. See id.
342. See LeRoy, supra note 17, at 251-52.
343. See, e.g., Arthur J. Martin, Company Sponsored El: A Union Perspective, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J.
119, 128 (1996) (arguing that the TEAM Act "is a disingenuous effort by the management lobby and
certain members of Congress to dilute employees' § 7 rights to organize a union by legitimizing hereto-
fore illegal obstacles to organization. The proposed amendment would also undermine the unions' role
as the exclusive representative of employees by permitting management dominated employee organiza-
tions to preempt or compete with the union as the representative of employees."). See also 141 CONo.
REc. H9524 (daily ed. Sept 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. William L. Clay) (arguing the TEAM Act is
"the latest installment in the campaign by the new Republican majority to eradicate protections afforded
to our workforce .... H.R. 743 [the TEAM Act] would effectively repeal Section 8(a)(2). It would
permit management to negotiate with itself while claiming it was carrying on discussions with represent-
atives chosen not by those they purport to represent, but by management itself.").
344. See, e.g., Hearing: H.R. 743, supra note 9, at 35-36 (statement of David M. Silberman, Direc-
tor AFL-CIO Task Force on Labor Law) (arguing that "there is nothing in Section 8(a)(2) which in any
way prohibits employers from 'transferring decision-making power to the workers"' or that prevents
management from "involving employees intellectually in the business"). See also 141 CONG. REC.
H9530 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Beccera) ("We do not need H.R. 743 [the TEAM
Act] because . . . 80 percent of all large employers . . . and over 30,000 workplaces already use [EI
programs]."); 141 CONG. REc. H9530 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. William L. Clay)
(quoting a letter from NLRB Chairman Edward Miller which asserted that "the so-called Electromation
problem.., is [a] myth. It is indeed possible to have effective [El] programs... in both union and non-
union companies without the necessity of any changes in current law.").
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organizations at will.3 45 As a result, if the TEAM Act were to become law,
opponents argue, employers would quickly reintroduce organizations bear-
ing striking functional if not structural similarities to the company unions of
the 1930s.346  Legalization of management-initiated EI programs would
also undermine existing unions.347 Employers could make temporary con-
cessions as a means of winning employees over to committees, thereby un-
dermining the union. Thus, for opponents, tampering with Section 8(a)(2)
would critically damage the American labor movement.348
Finally, opponents argue, the TEAM Act does not democratize the
workplace because it makes no provisions for employees to elect represent-
atives. Instead, employers could effectively dominate El groups by impos-
ing "representative" arrangements on employees, a practice "contrary to the
democratic assumptions of American society. 3 49
Despite these criticisms, both the House and the Senate passed the
TEAM Act during the 104th Congress.350 President Clinton vetoed the Act,
claiming that although he supported "workplace practices that promote co-
operative labor-management relations," the TEAM Act would reintroduce
345. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H9525 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bonoir); 142
CONG. REc. S7475 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("[T]he TEAM Act would make
it legal for management to foist a labor organization on employees that employees did not ask for or...
vote for. It would be legal for management to impose a company-dominated union made up of employ-
ees hand-picked solely by the employer. They would meet when the employer sees fit, consider only
issues the employer wants to consider and then speak for all employees when they do so."); Hearing:
Legal Problems with Employee Involvement Programs, supra note 20, at 65 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1996)
(statement of Alan Reuther, Legislative Director, International Union UAW) ("[D]espite all of the rheto-
ric by the proponents of the TEAM Act about the need for labor-management cooperation, it is apparent
that this bill is not designed to foster genuine cooperative efforts between equal, independent partners.
Instead, it would allow employers to establish the equivalent of 'puppet' governments, which could be
used by management to rubber stamp their decisions and to suppress employee dissent .... [E]mployers
often try to use these types of sham, company-dominated unions to undermine devices to resist union
organizing drives by real independent unions.").
346. See, e.g., id. at 28-29 (statement of Alan. Reuther) ("[I]f S.295 [TEAM Act] were enacted
into law, employers would be perfectly free to pick who would serve as representatives for workers on
committees. The employer could dictate the structure and powers of the committees, stacking them with
a preponderance of management representatives. Employers would even dictate what issues could be
discussed by the committees. And, if the employer did not agree with certain proposals by the commit-
tee, management would be perfectly free to ignore the proposals, or indeed to disband the entire commit-
tee. In our experience, employers often try to use these types of sham company-dominated unions to
undermine organizational drives by real independent unions.").
347. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). See also DUNLOP COMM'N.
FINAL REP., supra note 205, at 9 (cautioning that employers not be permitted to bypass unions when
they implement El programs).
348. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 87, at d-11 (May 9, 1994) (quoting letter from Prof. Charles J.
Morris of Southern Methodist University).
349. Employee Participation: Business Leaders Urge Clinton to Sign Teamwork Legislation, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at d-6 (quoting NLRB Chairman William B. Gould).
350. See 141 CONG. REc. H9556 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995); 142 CONG. REc. 57619 (daily ed. July
9, 1996). See also Employee Participation: Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite Pleas from Business for
its Passage, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at d-4 (July 31, 1996) (noting that the TEAM Act passed
the House by a vote of 221-202 and that a nearly identical bill passed the Senate by a vote of 53-43).
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company-dominated labor organizations and thus "undermine the system of
collective bargaining that has served this country so well for many
decades."351
The President's veto notwithstanding, the TEAM Act has proved to be
a remarkably hardy piece of legislation, and it is not likely to fade easily or
quickly from view. A version of the TEAM Act identical to the one the
President vetoed has been reintroduced in the Senate,352 where the Senate
Committee on Labor passed the Act despite threats of a filibuster.353 The
TEAM Act has also been reintroduced in the House.354 Administration of-
ficials have said that President Clinton will veto the bill again should it pass
during the current term.3 55
The current version of the TEAM Act has roots stretching back to the
debates over the Taft-Hartley Act. The TEAM Act resembles a bill passed
by the House3 56 but ultimately rejected in the Conference Committee in
favor of the current Section 9(a),357 which permits individual employees or
groups of employees in unionized workplaces to present grievances to the
employer without the intervention of the union.3 58 A version of the current
TEAM Act was also introduced during the 103rd Congress.35 9
351. H.R. Doc. No. 104-251 (1996).
352. See Labor Law: Senate Labor Panel Delays TEAM Act Vote for Lack of Quorum; Amend-
ments Put Off, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at AA-1 (March 1, 1997).
353. See Labor-Management Cooperation: Senate Panel Approves TEAM Act; Democrats Warn
Floor Fight, Filibuster, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at AA-1 (March 6, 1997).
354. See Legislation: Contentious Labor Bills Cleared for Debate in House and Senate, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at a-9 (March 7, 1997).
355. See id.
356. H.R. 3020, 80"' Cong. 26 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 56 (1948).
357. See H.R. CoNE. REP. No. 510, at 45 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 549 (1948) (indicating that the committee omitted the
bill because the "[Alct by its terms permits individual employees and groups of employees to meet with
the employer and Section 9(a) of the conference agreement permits employers to answer their griev-
ances"). Interestingly, the TEAM Act debate entertained similar arguments to those asserted in the
Section 8(d)(3) debate. See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 245, at 34 (1947) ("This clause does not permit
'company unions.' The employer and the committee may discuss and reach decisions, but neither side
may require the other to make an agreement, or to follow the procedures of collective bargaining set out
in Section 2(11)."); H. R. REP. No. 245, at 77, 85 (1947) (asserting that "[u]nder Section 8(a)(2) [as
modified by Section 8(d)(3)], the precise and clear language of the NLRA prohibiting the employer from
creating and maintaining company unions, and the abundant Board and court precedents giving vitality
to this guarantee, gives way to a confusing definition that would permit numerous forms of employer
domination of such labor organizations .... It is the beginning of the imposition on employees of many
employers' desire for a subservient labor organization .... It is aimed directly at current organizing
drives and will resurrect and legitimize those employee representation plans so familiar prior to the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act.").
358. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
359. See 139 CONG. REc. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum introduc-
ing the TEAM Act); Gunderson Bill Would Allow for Participatory Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. No. 60,
at a-14 (Mar. 31, 1993).
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Regardless of the TEAM Act's fate in the 105th Congress,360 given the
widespread support the Act enjoys among members of the business commu-
nity as well as the uncertain legal status of El programs, it is likely that,
barring clarification by the Supreme Court, legislative attempts to modify
Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) will continue.
B. Analysis of the TEAM Act
El programs can shape the quality of employees' work experiences in
positive and negative ways. They offer employees the prospect of greater
participation in discussions about conditions of work, a significant benefit
at a time when organizations like labor unions, designed to mediate be-
tween individuals and large institutions and to promote self-rule, are in de-
cline.36 Participation, however, is not always the equivalent of democracy.
Democracy presupposes that "voice" is accompanied by the ability to make
choices binding on the group as a whole. As long as management retains
the ability to create, structure, and terminate cooperative programs, such
programs are by definition employer-dominated labor organizations.
Whether expressed as welfare capitalism or as El, employers have the abil-
ity to make their wishes binding; employees do not. El programs, therefore,
offer employees more opportunities to participate in discussions in the
workplace without signficantly democratizing the workplace. As Grenier's
study demonstrates, employees' jobs may depend on the extent to which
their participation in El groups conforms to company-created attitudinal
norms. In this respect, participation may function not as a means of em-
ployee self-expression, but as a vehicle for the imposition of management's
values. As a result, employees may actually be less free in El programs
than they were in traditional hierarchical workplaces where employee-man-
agement communication may have been less frequent.
These difficulties have important implications for any attempt to alter
Section 8(a)(2) to accommodate employer-sponsored El programs. If labor
legislation is to perform its rightful but frequently overlooked role of recon-
ciling the social relations of the workplace with those of the broader soci-
ety, the inherent power of employers must be counterbalanced by labor
organizations responsible only to employees and capable of making
choices binding on the whole. Labor legislation must also prevent the crea-
tion of labor organizations which, in reality, serve only management's
360. Given the relatively narrow margins by which the TEAM Act passed the House and Senate, it
is unlikely that given the current composition of either body, enough votes could be mustered to over-
ride the President's veto.
361. See Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 Cm-KENr L. REv. 229 (1993). Kohler
claims that the decline of unions coincides with the decline of other mediating groups like the family,
religious congregations, and grassroots political clubs, which Tocqueville called "schools for democ-
racy." Id. at 230, 236, 238.
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needs or desires. The NLRA achieves both goals; the TEAM Act achieves
neither.
The TEAM Act is a proviso to Section 8(a)(2). The Act removes El
programs that might otherwise be considered employer-dominated labor or-
ganizations from the reach of Section 8(a)(2). While Section 8(a)(2) enu-
merates three specific forms of employer conduct that could amount to
unfair labor practices,362 the TEAM Act defines impermissible employer
conduct negatively, listing types of employer behavior that are not unfair
labor practices.363 This language, however, is broad enough to legalize El
programs which constitute per se violations of Section 8(a)(2). 3" The
question thus becomes whether the TEAM Act creates an exception that
swallows the rule, or whether the tensions between the TEAM Act and Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) are more apparent than real.
The response of the TEAM Act's supporters is somewhat schizo-
phrenic. When they refute criticisms that the TEAM Act would lead to the
reintroduction of company unions, supporters generally deny the existence
of any fundamental inconsistency between the NLRA and the TEAM
Act.36 5 Yet when they argue in favor of the social utility of legalizing El
programs, supporters often contend that the NLRA and Section 8(a)(2) are
archaic impediments to socially beneficial change in labor-management re-
lations.366 The principal line of argument, however, appears to be that the
TEAM Act merely creates a safe harbor within the NLRA for "legitimate"
El programs. But implicit in the concept of legitimacy is a recognition that
362. The three forms of conduct are: [1] employer domination of a labor organization; [2] employer
interference with the formation or administration of a labor organization; and [3] employer contribution
to or provision of financial or other support to a labor organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
363. Under the TEAM Act, it shall not be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to establish,
assist, maintain or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees who partici-
pate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of management participate, to address
matters of mutual interest, including but not limited to issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, safety
and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of the employees .... " TEAM Act, supra note 16, at § 3 (emphasis added).
364. Not only would the TEAM Act legalize El programs that deal with quality, safety, efficiency,
or productivity, it would also legalize programs whose activities could include discussion of wages,
hours, or other conditions of work. See H.R. REP. 104-248, supra note 17, at 18; S. RPE. 105-12. supra
note 18, at 22. The decisions of such groups could be made by managers and by employees acting in a
representative capacity. The TEAM Act would, therefore, legalize labor organizations created and dom-
inated by employers which would be empowered to engage in collective bargaining in all but name,
which was an outcome Section 8(a)(2) was intended to eliminate.
365. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S4789 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott) (stating that
"the TEAM Act just amends the Federal Labor laws to make clear that employers and employees can
meet together, in committee, or other employee involvement programs to address issues of mutual
concern").
366. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S7479 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Brown) (arguing
that "(t)he archaic provisions of Section 8(a)(2) of the 1935 NLRA are entirely out of step with modern
management techniques that are mutually beneficial to employers and employees. It is shocking to this
Senator that employers and employees are not allowed, under the law, to sit down and discuss issues of
importance to them.").
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the TEAM Act could open the door for the introduction of "illegitimate" El
programs capable of functioning much like the company unions of the
1930s.
Questions about the TEAM Act's consistency with the NLRA and its
potential to nurture the democratic potential of El programs may perhaps
best be approached by an analysis of the framers' conception of what con-
stitutes a legitimate El program. The legislative history of the TEAM Act
suggests that the legitimacy of an El program hinges not on its structure or
on the subject matter of El program discussions, but on whether an El pro-
gram interferes with employees' collective bargaining rights, should the
employees choose to exercise them.36 7 An El program would be "illegiti-
mate" and hence presumably subject to an unfair labor practice charge if,
for example, it were set up during an organizing campaign to make unioni-
zation a less attractive alternative to workers. An El program would also be
illegitimate if it interfered with employees' Section 7 rights by committing
other unfair labor practices enumerated in Section 8, or if it bypassed a
union representing the bargaining unit.3 68 In addition, an El program would
be illegitimate if it attempted to represent employees in collective bargain-
ing or if it attempted to alter the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.36 9 Thus, if an El program does not masquerade as a union or attempt
to usurp the functions of a traditional union, that El program is legitimate,
irrespective of whether it engages in discussions of hours, wages, or condi-
tions of work.37 0
The critical questions are: first, does this definition of legitimacy erect
adequate safeguards against the possibility that El groups will bargain with
employers over conditions of work 3 7 1 or otherwise infringe on employees'
Section 7 rights? And second, are the TEAM Act's criteria for legitimate
El programs capable of providing guidelines for nurturing the democratic
potential of El programs?
367. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 104-248, supra note 17, at 18; S. RaP. 105-12. supra note 18, at 23;
Hearing: Removing Impediments to Employee Participation, supra note 6, at 11 (statement of Rep.
Steve Gunderson).
368. See H.R. REP. 104-248, supra note 17, at 18; S. REP. 105-12. supra note 18, at 24; House
Approves TEAM Act, Restricts Employee Involvement Committee Activities in Union Settings, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at d-3 (June 23, 1995) (summarizing an amendment to the TEAM Act
offered by Rep. Tom Petri and passed by the House).
369. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 104-248, supra note 17, at 19; S. REP. 105-12. supra note 18, at 24;
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 295 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 33 (1997) (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi). But see 141
CONG. REc. H9528 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Charlie Rose) (opposing H.R. 743
because it expanded the capability of company dominated committees to discuss terms and conditions of
employment, rather than limiting discussion to issues of production and quality).
370. This concept of legitimacy overlooks the NLRA framers' belief that employer-created labor
organizations that dealt with conditions of work were per se violative of the policies which informed the
Act. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
371. Such a practice would undermine the rationale for the creation of independent labor organiza-
tions. See generally LeRoy, supra note 17, at 257.
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1. Discussion of Statutory Bargaining Subjects in El Groups under the
TEAM Act
Scholars sympathetic to the TEAM Act have dismissed as hyperbole
predictions that passage of the Act would lead to the reintroduction of com-
372pany unions. One commentator contends that the TEAM Act seeks only
to codify the Board's conception, expressed in the Electromation and du
Pont decisions, of permissible employer activities in an El program con-
text.37 If, however, the TEAM Act simply codifies the Board's rulings on
permissible El activity, why is legislation like the TEAM Act is necessary
in the first place?
Another commentator has argued that the TEAM Act clarifies confu-
sion surrounding the legal status of El programs by removing discussion of
matters of "mutual interest" from challenge under Section 8(a)(2).37 4 The
NLRB has distinguished between subjects like wages, hours, and griev-
ances, which are of interest primarily to employees, 375 and subjects like
productivity, efficiency, and productivity, which are employer interests.376
Between the two lies an area of mutual interests, including safety, conserva-
tion of supplies and materials, and the encouragement of industry and initia-
tive.37 7 Both employer and mutual interests are permissive bargaining
subjects. 3 78 By opening these areas, which fall outside the ambit of collec-
tive bargaining, to employer-employee discussion, the TEAM Act provides
employees with greater participation in workplace decision-making, and in
doing so paves the way for more democratic modes of workplace
organization.37 9
There are two difficulties with this argument. First, the term "mutual
interests" has been given a number of meanings, some of which differ sig-
nificantly from the Board's definition in Electromation. For instance, some
372. See id. at 240-41.
373. See id. at 257. According to LeRoy, the TEAM Act codifies language in Electromation which
states that even though an employer may control an El group, no Section 8(a)(2) violation occurs when
the group's discussions are limited to quality, productivity and efficiency. See id. at 240.
374. See Rominger, supra note 282, at 194. According to this argument, companies need legal
certainty in order to pursue their El goals. See id. at 192.
375. See id. at 190.
376. See id. Under current law, employers may create El programs that deal with employer inter-
ests, as long as these groups do not stray into discussion of wages, hours, or conditions. See id. at 190-
91.
377. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1001 (1992) (Devaney, member, concurring).
378. For a discussion of mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects and cases which developed
the distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects, see infra note 384. Under these
cases, subjects like quality, productivity, and efficiency are employer interests. See Rominger, supra
note 282, at 190. The subjects identified by Member Devaney as mutual interests would be permissive
bargaining subjects. See id. at 190.
379. See id. at 195.
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commentators argue that mutual interests encompass conditions of work.
3 80
Under the proposed Section 8(d)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, mutual inter-
ests are synonymous with statutory bargaining subjects.3 8 ' The TEAM Act
defines mutual interests as productivity, quality, and efficiency, despite the
fact that the Board in Electromation defined these subjects as management
interests. Finally, Rominger contends that the TEAM Act would leave fur-
ther definition of areas of mutual interest to case-by-case analysis.38 In the
absence of a uniform definition of mutual interests, it is difficult to see how
the term can serve as a useful analytical criterion for distinguishing between
legitimate and illegitimate El program discussions.
The claim that discussion of topics of mutual interest will somehow
democratize the workplace is also suspect. Under current Board precedent,
employers and employees are already permitted to discuss quality, safety,
and productivity.383 But because these concerns are not mandatory bargain-
ing topics, even when a union is present, the choice of whether to initiate
discussion remains the employer' .384 True expansion of the realm of em-
ployee participation would necessitate either expansion of the scope of
mandatory bargaining to include both mutual and employer interests, or, in
non-union contexts, the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing employees
380. See, e.g., Hearing: Legal Problems with Employee Involvement Programs, supra note 20, at
84 (statement of David E. Khorey, labor and employment law attorney) (claiming that "'[m]atters of
mutual interest' is at least as broad as 'conditions of work"').
381. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., § 8(d)(3) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIsLATVE HISTORY OF TiE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONs ACT, 1947, at 56 (1948) (defining mutual interests as "grievances,
wages, hours of employment and other working conditions").
382. See Rominger, supra note 282, at 194. If in fact such definition would have to occur case-by-
case, it is difficult to see how the TEAM Act would represent an improvement over the NLRB's inter-
est-based approach, which proponents of the TEAM Act argue contributes to the lack of clarity over the
legal status of El under current law. See id. at 192.
383. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
384. The concept of mandatory and permissive bargaining topics derives from judicial interpreta-
tion of Section 8(d) of the NLRA, added to the Act by the Taft-Hartley amendments. See generally 29
U.S.C. §158(d) (1994) (defining topics over which an employer is obligated to bargain in good faith as
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). Under the original
version of the NLRA, the scope of bargaining was not limited. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 356 (1958) (Harlan J. concurring). Theoretically, even with the addition of
Section 8(d), "conditions of work" would be broad enough to include discussion of virtually any work-
place issue. The Supreme Court, however, has held that Section 8(d) requires that distinctions be drawn
between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203, 219 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring). The Court has not formulated a bright line test for
distinguishing mandatory from permissive bargaining subjects. The thrust of mandatory/permissive ju-
risprudence has been to narrow and circumscribe the areas of mandatory bargaining. The following
would appear to be permissive bargaining subjects: the introduction of machinery, the liquidation of
assets, the decision to go out of business, financing, and advertising, product type, and design issues. See
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676-77 (1981). Thus, discussion of topics
like quality, efficiency, and concerns about productivity-in short, many of the topics with which EI
groups deal-would appear to be permissive bargaining subjects. Hence, even if a union were present,
these subjects could be discussed only if the employer proposes discussion to an El group or if the
employer consents to discussion of these issues.
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the right to insist on discussion of topics of mutual or employer interest.
The absence of language granting employees these rights suggests that
these outcomes were not envisioned by the TEAM Act.385 Thus, although
the TEAM Act's mutual interest approach may lead to greater employee
participation, it is important not to conflate participation with democracy.
Assessments of the TEAM Act's ability to maintain distinctions be-
tween collective bargaining and EI group activities were based on early
versions of the Act, which denominated quality, productivity, and efficiency
matters of mutual interest but which did not-explicitly at least-expand
the definition of mutual interests to include conditions of work.386 Later
versions of the TEAM Act, however, suggest that the Act does much more
than codify Electromation.87 The range of El activities legalized in these
versions is broad, indeed, extending far beyond legalization of El programs
focused on a narrow band of mutual interests. Under the TEAM Act, per-
missible activities in an El program context would include, but would not
be limited to, discussion of quality, safety, efficiency, etc. 388 Discussion of
wages, hours, and conditions of work would therefore be permissible in an
El group context as long as the El groups did not engage in collective
bargaining.
In his study of EI groups, LeRoy found little empirical evidence sug-
gesting that EI group activities actually extended beyond discussions of
quality, productivity, and efficiency or that discussion within El groups was
the functional equivalent of collective bargaining.389 Nonetheless, in order
to determine how post-TEAM Act El groups might function, it is necessary
to examine what kinds of practices the language and the legislative history
of the Act would permit.
In this context, what is absent from the TEAM Act is at least as signifi-
cant as the Act's specific provisions. For example, there is no express lan-
guage in the TEAM Act prohibiting El groups from formulating agreements
that would impact wages, hours, or working conditions. In this respect, it is
385. There is no language in the TEAM Act to suggest that employees can shape or set the agenda
of El group discussions.
386. See, e.g., H.R. 743, 104th Cong., §3 (Version 1 and Version 2) ("[I]t shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain,
or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees participate, to address
matters of mutual interest, including issues of quality, productivity, and efficiency .... ").
387. See, e.g., H.R. 743, 104th Cong., §3 (1995) (Version 6); H.R. 634, 105th Cong., §3 (1997)
("[I]t shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer
to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees
who participate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of management participate, to
address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, productivity, effi-
ciency, and safety and health .. ) (emphasis added).
388. See id.
389. See LeRoy, supra note 17, at 218. LeRoy did, however, acknowledge that his small sample
and other methodological issues might limit the extent to which his findings could be generalized. See
id. at 242-44.
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difficult to see how the TEAM Act enables distinctions to be drawn be-
tween discussion and collective bargaining. The most obvious distinction is
that collective bargaining agreements are enforceable. Thus, agreements
forged by El groups, which include provisions that touch on statutory bar-
gaining subjects, would pass muster under the TEAM Act only if employ-
ees lacked the power to enforce them. It is, therefore, difficult to escape the
conclusion that the TEAM Act's prohibition against El groups entering into
collective bargaining serves employer interests by preventing the creation
of "the very types of agreements employers do not want in the first
place."
390
In addition, the Act's legislative history also indicates that El programs
focusing solely on discussions of statutory bargaining subjects would not be
impermissible. For example, supporters' conceptions of legitimate El
group activity include employer formation of groups to discuss issues like
scheduling, a statutory bargaining subject.391 Supporters do not overlook
the fact that these groups could be considered employer-dominated labor
organizations, but they prefer to focus on how such groups represent com-
mon sense ways of solving workplace problems.392 Irrespective of the
framer's intent, however, even de minimis discussion of statutory bargain-
ing subjects in EI groups could undermine the rationale for independent
unionism as well as the integrity of the collective bargaining system envi-
sioned by the NLRA.393
Perhaps the most efficient way to have prevented confusion over the
role and the purposes of El groups would have been to restrict El group
discussions to issues of quality, efficiency, or productivity and to limit
strictly any discussion of statutory bargaining subjects. Two such propos-
als, one offered by Representative Sawyer during House discussion of the
390. Martin, supra note 343, at 128-29.
391. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H9528 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Meyers) (noting
that "last week, I sent around a 'Dear Colleague' letter which described a situation that would occur in
any small business-an employee made a suggestion about summer hours to her supervisor and the
supervisor though [sic] it was a good idea. The supervisor liked the idea and asked the employee to get a
group together to discuss the matter, and found a room for the group to meet. Unfortunately under
current law, this kind of system could lead to problems for the employer ..... ;Id. at H9540 (statement
of Rep. James M. Talent) ("A supervisor goes to the plant manager and says people are upset because
they are working a lot of overtime. The schedules, they say, are not right. They want some changes so
they can get to day care centers, a couple of guys have hunting vacations planned. What shall we do?
The manager says 'well, I would like to sit down and work with them and then come to me with a
proposal.' Why do we not want them to be able to do that?").
392. See id. (statement of Rep. Talent) ("Mr. Chairman, the gentlemen will agree that scheduling is
a term and condition of employment is it not? . . . [U]nder current law there is no question if that
supervisor goes out and says, okay, Bill and Bob, let us talk about it and sit down Jane. And, by the way,
we better get Mel and Fred, because I know they are upset about this too. That is dominating because the
supervisor is involved in choosing which employees are involved in the discussion ...."),
393. Cf Cochran, supra note 3, at 511 (arguing that "participation schemes possibly threaten to
undermine unions by giving employers an alternative vehicle to empower, or at least appear to em-
power, employees within the corporate structure").
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TEAM Act and the other offered by Senator Dorgan, would have limited El
group discussions.3 94 The Sawyer and Dorgan amendments were de-
feated.395 Both amendments recognized that EI groups might, at times, dis-
cuss wages, hours, or conditions of work, but, like the Dunlop
Commission's recommendations, both amendments permitted the discus-
sion of mandatory bargaining subjects only if these discussions were ancil-
lary to the groups' main purposes.39 6 Arguably, rejection of both
amendments indicates that the TEAM Act's supporters have little interest in
limiting the scope of the Act to a narrow band of production or quality-
centered El programs.
If the TEAM Act provides no meaningful protections against El
groups usurping traditional union functions, the next question is whether the
TEAM Act's conception of legitimacy is capable of providing adequate
protection against the possibility 397 that El programs will function in ways
antithetical to the values that both the NLRA and the polity attempt to
foster.39 8
2. Protection of Employees' Section 7 Rights under the TEAM Act
Although supporters of the TEAM Act point to the Act's prohibition
against El groups engaging in collective bargaining or attempting to repre-
sent employees in collective bargaining as evidence that the TEAM Act will
not undermine the system of industrial relations envisioned by the NLRA,
the integrity of that system depends upon employees' ability to exercise a
core of rights enumerated in Section 7 of the NLRA.3 99 Thus, protection of
rights guaranteed employees under the NLRA entails more than prohibi-
tions against El groups engaging in collective bargaining. According to
394. For the text of the Sawyer Amendment, see 141 CONG. Rec. H9536-37 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
1995). For the text of the Dorgan Amendment, see 142 CONG. REc. S7484-85 (daily ed. July 9, 1996).
395. See 141 CONG. Rac. H9546 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (reporting that the Sawyer Amendment
was defeated by a vote of 204 Ayes, 221 Noes, with 9 not voting); 142 CONG. REc. S7618 (daily ed.
July 9, 1996) (The Dorgan amendment was defeated by a vote of 36 Yeas, 63 Noes and 1 not voting).
396. Compare 142 CONG. REc. S7484-85 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (the Dorgan amendment, § 3)
with 141 CoNG. REc. H9536-37 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (the Sawyer Amendment, § 3 ). Both amend-
ments were criticized on the grounds that many El group activities-such as the creation of flexible
schedules-would remain illegal. See 141 CONG. REc. H9541-42 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Goodling). Opponents also argued that the amendments would create a "host of new legal terms
that would be the subject of years of litigation." Id. (statement of Rep. Goodling). Determining whether
discussions of statutory bargaining subjects are ancillary to an EI group's main activities would spawn
some litigation. But the same can be said of most new legislation. Besides, there is no indication that an
unamended TEAM Act would spawn less litigation than either the Sawyer or Dorgan Amendments. For
a discussion of the Dunlop Commission's views on discussions of conditions of work, see supra note
208 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
398. See id.
399. Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees the right to: form, join, or assist in labor organiza-
tions; bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of mutual aid and protection; and refrain from engaging in any and all such
activities. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
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Section 4 of the TEAM Act, nothing contained in the Act would affect
employees' rights and responsibilities under any section of the NLRA other
than Section 8(a)(2). Although the TEAM Act appears to protect employ-
ees' freedom to exercise their Section 7 rights, the legislative history of the
Act suggests otherwise.
At the most basic level, employee empowerment would appear to re-
quire that employees who act in a representative capacity be elected by their
peers. The TEAM Act itself is silent on the question of how employee
representatives in El programs might be selected; however, an amendment
offered by Representative Moran, which would have required the election
of team members, was defeated. 4" Opposition to the amendment stemmed
in part from the view that election procedures were cumbersome and bu-
reaucratic and would make it impossible for El programs to achieve the
flexibility needed to respond quickly to workplace concerns.40 ' Defeat of
the Moran Amendment suggests that the TEAM Act would permit the crea-
tion of El programs in which managers hand picked employee participants.
It is difficult to understand how employees can be empowered when they
are denied the Section 7 right to choose their own representatives. °2
The TEAM Act also has the potential to undermine the principle of
employee choice implicit in Section 7 in other ways as well. First, Section
7 grants employees the right to form, join, and assist labor organizations,
and the right to refrain from such activities."' The logic and legislative
history of the NLRA clearly do not confer the right to participate in em-
400. See 141 CONG. REc. D 1i54 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (reporting that the Moran Amendment,
which would have required persons representing employees in EI groups to be elected by a majority of
the employees by secret ballot, was defeated by a vote of 195 ayes to 228 noes).
401. See 141 CoNG. REc. H9551 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. James M. Talent)
(arguing that "if people ... [want elections,] there is a method to get th[em]. Under current law, it is
called a union.").
402. See 29 U.S.C. §157 (1994). But see Charles J. Morris, Will There Be a New Direction For
American Industrial Relations? A Hard Look at the TEAM Bill, The Sawyer Substitute Bill, and the
Employee Involvement Bill, 49 LAB. L.J. 89 (1996) (arguing that because the TEAM Act does not alter
the definitions of a labor organization in Section 2(5) of the NLRA and Section 302 of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), those provisions would continue to
apply to post-TEAM Act El programs). In addition, even if the TEAM Act effectively repealed Section
8(a)(2), employer provision of financial assistance to a labor organization, would still be impermissible
under Section 302 of the LMRDA. See id. Though the TEAM Act makes no provision for employees to
elect representatives to EI programs, Title I of the LMRDA and its report filing provisions would require
periodic election of El program representatives. See id. The ability to elect representatives, however,
will not, in and of itself, cure the fundamental inability of management-initiated cooperative programs to
democratize the workplace.
403. See 29 U.S.C. §157 (1947), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) ("Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. and shall also have the right to refrain from any
and all of such activities except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 158(a)(3) of
this title.").
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ployer-created labor organizations. If follows that refusal to participate in
such organizations would not be protected under Section 7. Moreover, the
TEAM Act includes no language protecting employees who refuse to par-
ticipate in El groups, even those which engage in discussions of work.'
Second, it is possible that employees would attempt to create an El program
but that employers would either refuse to participate or to allow the creation
of such groups. If joint employer-employee groups that deal with statutory
bargaining subjects are to be legalized by the TEAM Act, while the remain-
der of Section 8(a)(2) is left unchanged, employer refusal to participate in
an employee-created El groups could amount to employer interference with
the formation of a labor organization. But the TEAM Act creates only an
employer exception to Section 8(a)(2). Therefore, although it would no
longer be an unfair labor practice under the TEAM Act for an employer to
create an El program which could discuss statutory bargaining subjects, the
Act grants employees no reciprocal right to demand employer participation
in such a program. In this way, the TEAM Act increases only the realm of
employer choice.
In addition, because El programs do not fundamentally alter power
relationships within a business, El groups may by their very nature impose
considerable pressure on employees to affirm management's decisions or
points of view. It is true that under the TEAM Act employees who believe
they have been discharged or otherwise discriminated against for engaging
in the activities protected by Section 7 could file an unfair labor practice
charge.4 '5 However, it is important to note that the TEAM Act does not
address, much less provide mechanisms to control against, other, more sub-
tle, forms of employer behavior that can also place pressure on employees
to act in management's interest rather than their own. The need for such
protections may be particularly great because contact between management
and employees is relatively more frequent in El groups than in traditional
workplaces and because the TEAM Act would apply only to unorganized
workplaces.40 6 Consequently, those covered by the TEAM Act are also
likely to be at-will employees, particularly sensitive and vulnerable to sub-
404. The Dorgan and Sawyer amendments did, however, contain such language. See 142 CoNG.
REC. S7485 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (the Dorgan amendment, § 3(2)(C)); 141 CONG. REc. H9537 (daily
ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (the Sawyer Amendment, § 3(iii)(C).). See also H.R. REP. 104-248, supra note 17,
at 39 (minority report noting defeat of amendment which sought to ensure expedited hearings for em-
ployees illegally discharged for attempting to organize unions in lieu of El programs).
405. See 142 CoNG. Rac. S7618 (daily ed. July 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum) ("[T]he
TEAM Act ... applies only to nonunion settings.").
406. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that some forms of management action are so
inherently destructive to unionization that no showing of employer anti-union animus is required, in
§ 8(a)(3) cases such a showing is generally required. The affected employee bears the burden of making
a prima facie case. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967). This burden can
be particularly heavy when an employer asserts a legitimate business reason for discharging or otherwise
disciplining an employee or when an employer has a legitimate business reason for his actions as well as
an illegitimate reason. See Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980).
1998] CAPTURING VOLITION ITSELF
tie forms of management pressure. Absent either consideration of, or ex-
plicit safeguards against, such pressures, it is difficult to see how the TEAM
Act would not undermine-at least indirectly-employees' exercise of their
Section 7 rights.
Finally, under the so-called "supervisory exclusion" added to the
NLRA by the Taft-Hartley Act,40 7 employees who assume management
functions in El programs may be viewed as supervisors and thus lose their
collective bargaining rights.4 °8 The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. suggests that the Court may be
widening the definition of supervisorial activities.4 °9 In this case, the Court
held that all acts directing co-workers and within the scope of employment
are in the interest of the employer. Thus, any employee who responsibly
directs co-workers may be a supervisor and therefore denied the protections
of the NLRA.41 ° The Sawyer and Dorgan Amendments attempted to pre-
serve the collective bargaining protections of employees assigned manage-
rial functions in El programs."a ' The defeat of these amendments,
407. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1994).
408. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 286 (1974) (quoting
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 (1947)) (defining managers as those who "formu-
late and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of the em-
ployer"). The Court has held that professional employees can also be considered supervisors. See NLRB
v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980) (holding that university professors who vote on matters
such as class size and curriculum exercise managerial authority when they exercise judgment in their
work, and have interests that are inseparable from those of the institution). Thus, an employee's duties,
not the specific job title, will define whether the employee is a supervisor. See Lipsky, supra note 24, at
682-83.
409. 511 U.S. 571 (1994). At issue in the case was whether the Board's test for determining
whether nurses who directed the activities of less-skilled employees were supervisors was consistent
with Section 2(11) of the NLRA. See id. at 572, 574-75. Section 2(11) of the NLRA defines supervisors
as those who exercise independent judgment in the interest of the employer to, inter alia, responsibly
direct other employees. See id. at 573. The Board held that the nurses were not supervisors because their
supervisory activity was incidental to the treatment of patients, and were not exercised in the interest of
the employer. See id. at 576. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that the case was concep-
tually analogous to Yeshiva and that the Board's distinction between patient care and activities in the
interest of the employer created a "false dichotomy." See id. at 577. Thus, the Court held that there was
"no basis for the Board's blanket assertion that supervisory authority exercised in connection with pa-
tient care is somehow not in the interest of the employer." Id. at 577-78.
410. The Court noted that because the Board's interpretation of "in the interest of the employer"
was limited, for the most part, to nursing cases, the Court's holding in the case would likely have little
effect on employees in other contexts. See id. at 583-84. Nonetheless, it is possible that the logic of the
case could be used to define as supervisors other professional employees who exercise independent
judgment in directing others. See DuNLOp COMM'N FrNAL REP., supra note 205, at 10 (discussing the
possible effect of the case on expanding the scope of the supervisory exclusion). As a result, it is possi-
ble that employees in El groups who gain decision-making authority will lose their collective bargaining
protections.
411. See 142 CONG. REc. S7471 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (the Dorgan amendment, §3(3)) ("An
employee who participates in a group, unit, or committee described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of
paragraph (1) shall not be considered to be a supervisor or manager because of the participation of the
employee in the group, unit, or committee."); 141 CONo. REc. H9537 (dally ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (the
Sawyer Amendment, § 3(iii)(D)) ("[I1ndividuals who participate in an entity established pursuant to
subparagraph (i), (ii), or (iii) shall not be deemed to be supervisors or managers."). See also DuNLoP
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particularly in the context of the Health Care & Retirement Corp. decision,
suggests that in this area as well, the TEAM Act's protection of employees'
collective bargaining rights may prove entirely meaningless. Employers
could thwart union organizing drives by assigning supervisory tasks to all
El program members. In addition, even though assignment of supervisory
functions to El group members might be an indication of anti-union animus,
such a charge might be difficult if not impossible to prove given the blur-
ring of lines of demarcation between employees and managers contained in
many El programs.4 1 2
The TEAM Act's failure to create an exception to the supervisory ex-
clusion for employees in El groups would make it possible for employers to
use El as a means of denying collective bargaining rights to significant
portions of the work force. Given the fact that many employees do not
volunteer to participate in El programs but are simply included in them by
virtue of a management decision to organize an entire facility or department
into El groups, it is possible that employees assigned supervisory functions
in El programs would have no voice at all in determining whether they wish
to surrender their collective bargaining protections. In this respect, the
TEAM Act empowers employers, not employees, and provides employees
with virtually no protection of their collective bargaining rights.
The TEAM Act's inability to provide meaningful protection of em-
ployees' collective bargaining rights also renders meaningless its support-
ers' contention that if employees in an El program are dissatisfied they can
always join a union 413-a contention which, in any event, serves only to
strengthen the opposing argument that it is only through union representa-
tion that employees' rights can be protected.
3. The TEAM Act's Conception of the Scope of Employer/Employee
Participation in E1 Groups
In addition to criteria suggested by the Act's legislative history, the
legitimacy of an El program under the TEAM Act hinges on another analyt-
ical criterion: whether employees and managers participate in an El pro-
COMM'N. FINAL RaP., supra note 205, at 9 (recommending that Congress restrict the scope of the mana-
gerial and supervisory exclusions so that professionals and other workers who participate in decision-
making at work not be stripped of their collective bargaining rights).
412. See DuNLop COMM'N FACT-FINDING RaP., supra note 2, at 38 (noting that "[olver time it
becomes increasingly difficult if not impossible to draw a line ... among 'employees,' 'supervisors,'
and 'managers' in ... productivity and quality improvement efforts").
413. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H9538 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fawell) (argu-
ing that if cooperation does not work "a union will be organized"). See also 141 CONG. REc. H9551
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Talent) ("[I]f people have a representative who will go in
and collectively bargain and want a secret ballot and they want the months and months of campaigning,
there is a method to get that. Under current law, it is called a union.").
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gram "to the same extent practicable."' 4 The Act makes no attempt to give
substantive content to the phrase "the same extent practicable." '415 The
question becomes what kinds of interpretive standards might be used to
make "to the same extent practicable" determinations?
Implicit in the term "practicable" is an assumption that employers and
employees would not enjoy absolute equality in El groups. The degree of
participation practicable for each group may be a function of other factors
not enumerated in the Act or its legislative history. Some of those factors
might include status differences between employers and employees gener-
ally or characteristics of a particular employment context which might
make it impossible for employees and employers to participate equally in El
group discussions.
At bottom, determining whether employers and employees participate
equally, to the extent practicable, is another way of asking whether an El
group is employer dominated. Courts could look to existing Section 8(a)(2)
precedent for guidance in making "to the same extent practicable" determi-
nations. The TEAM Act would overrule Newport News.416 But, a totality
of the circumstances analysis adapted from the Free Choice tests for em-
ployer domination of El groups would, at least initially, appear to offer
useful analytical criteria for making "to the same extent practicable" deter-
minations.4" 7 Specifically, if the degree of employee and management par-
ticipation is conceptualized as a function of circumstances unique to a
particular employment relationship, a totality of the circumstances test
might help to elucidate how much employee participation is practicable in a
given El program. The principle difficulty with the Free Choice approach
is that it requires courts to examine the circumstances from the perspective
of employees.418 Thus, employee perceptions of the degree of employee
participation practicable in a given context would be dispositive. As the
previous sections suggest, however, the TEAM Act is concerned with ex-
panding the realm of employer, not employee, choice under the NLRA.
Therefore, the policy objectives of the TEAM Act and Free Choice case law
are in conflict.4 19
414. The phrase "who participate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of man-
agement" was added to the Act by an amendment sponsored by Rep. Traficant. See 141 CoNo. REc.
H9553 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995).
415. Rep. Traficant initially stated that the intent of the amendment was to enable employers and
employees to participate equally. But when pressed by Rep. Fawell to define the amendment more
precisely, Rep. Traficant replied "I leave it open and broad enough" as to what "the same extent practi-
cable" is in fact. See 141 CONG. REc. H9552 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Traficant).
416. Under the structural approach, any labor organization structurally dependent on management
is employer dominated. Many of the El programs the TEAM Act would legalize would be employer-
dominated labor organization under the Newport News test.
417. See supra notes 177-97 and accompanying text.
418. See id.
419. Analyzing the extent of practicable equal participation in an El group from the standpoint of
employees, as the Free Choice Approach mandates, presents other analytical problems. In addition to the
19981
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One commentator has suggested that in the context of El programs, the
principle of mutuality-articulated at least to some extent in Electroma-
tion-may be the best guide for distinguishing between cooperation and
domination.42 ° Courts could focus on whether employees played a signifi-
cant role in creating or administering the organization and on whether the
organization had an existence independent of management.421 The ability
of the employer to abolish the organization unilaterally could be an addi-
tional indication of employer domination as could employer appointment of
employee representatives.422 Here again, however, such an approach would
appear to be in conflict with the TEAM Act's language and legislative his-
tory, which, in effect, grant employers virtually unlimited freedom to create,
structure, and dissolve El programs.
Finally, practicable employer/employee participation in El groups
could be a function of status differences between employees and managers.
The Board and the courts have defined supervisory and managerial func-
tions in some detail. But the utility of this case law in making "to the same
extent practicable" determinations is limited. If managers exercise discre-
tion but employees do not, the logic this body of case law dictates that
supervisory-level employees would have considerably more input into deci-
sion-making than would ordinary employees. Employees and managers
would be able to participate equally in El groups only if employees who
exercised supervisory functions were deemed managers. While there is a
measure of equity in a grant of equal participation in El groups serving as
the quid pro quo for the loss of collective bargaining protections, there is no
indication in its legislative history that the TEAM Act contemplates em-
ployees-even those who might legally be supervisors-and managers ex-
ercising equal authority within El programs.
Utilization of existing case law in making "to the same extent practica-
ble" determinations would, therefore, lead to outcomes that are inconsistent
with the TEAM Act's conception of the appropriate relationship between
employers and employees. When coupled with the fact that neither the Act
itself not its legislative history gives any indication of what kinds of inter-
pretive criteria ought to be used to gauge how much employer and em-
difficulties inherent in measuring subjective impressions, employee perceptions can change over time.
For instance, employees may be much more optimistic about, and hence set higher standards for, "prac-
ticable" equal participation with management early in an El group's development and revise their expec-
tations downward as time passes (or vice versa). As a result, it may be difficult to determine when
employee perceptions can most reliably be measured. On the other hand, deciding "to the same extent
practicable" questions from the employer's point of view could be equally, if not more, unreliable. El
programs are usually designed by employers. Thus, a focus on employer perceptions could result in a
court simply "rubber stamping" employer decisions. A third alternative of deciding the question from
the point of view of a "reasonable person"would substitute Board or judicial perceptions for those of the
parties. This would, in effect, replace employer paternalism with judicial paternalism.




ployee participation is "practicable," the phrase becomes, for all intents and
purposes, meaningless. If the phrase is meaningless, and if the Act provides
no meaningful protection against El programs engaging in the functional
equivalent of bargaining over mandatory subjects, the net effect of the
TEAM Act is that under Section 8(a)(2) it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to dominate or interfere with the formation of a labor organiza-
tion, unless that labor organization is an employer-created and employer-
dominated labor organization. In effect, the exception swallows the rule.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing suggests, the contention that the TEAM Act would
legalize El programs which empower workers and which democratize the
workplace is incorrect at best and disingenuous at worst. By legitimizing
virtually any management-created program as long as it calls itself an El
program, the TEAM Act serves only management interests. The principle
difficulty with the TEAM Act is not so much that its passage would lead to
the reintroduction of discredited labor organizations like the company un-
ions of the 1930's, but that it would legitimize an approach to industrial
relations, the structure and underlying assumptions of which need to be
questioned, particularly in an era of declining union density. The manage-
ment-initiated cooperative model masks but does not alter the hierarchical
authoritarian structure of the employment relationship. Managerial self-re-
straint-not independent worker organization or the creation of enforceable
legal limits on employer action-is the only barrier against employer con-
trol of organizations that purport to speak, at least to some extent, to em-
ployee interests and concerns. While management-initiated cooperative
programs may be consistent with improved efficiency, productivity, or
competitiveness, corporate paternalism-whether expressed as El or wel-
fare capitalism-is inconsistent with the promotion of democratic values in
the workplace. Passage of the TEAM Act would, therefore, legalize an
approach to industrial relations practice which, like welfare capitalism, cre-
ates the appearance of employee empowerment but does not develop true
industrial democracy. Accordingly, to suggest, as do the framers of the
TEAM Act, that the proliferation of the El model in non-union workplaces
is consistent with the values and policies of the NLRA is to misrepresent
the nature of both El and the NLRA.
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